

The EU-Africa Migration Partnership:

An assessment of EU constraints and African leverage – a case study of Ghana and Senegal

*Tine Van Criekinge**

PhD Candidate

Department of International Relations

London School of Economics

Paper presented at the EUSA Conference

22-25 April 2008

Los Angeles, California

Abstract:

This paper explores the extent to which the EU's external migration policy has impacted its relations with Africa. It briefly overviews the recent policy developments in the EU's approach to migration in its relations with Africa, noting that while some high-level dialogue emerging on joint migration management, in general EU's policy has focused mainly on migration control rather than creating a genuine migration-development nexus. This is followed by a discussion of the African migration agenda, which has instead largely focused on making migration a positive tool for development, requesting development aid in order to tackle the root causes of migration, and ensuring the protection of migrant rights abroad. It is argued that in the formulation of a migration policy the EU faces particular constraints in its interactions with third countries that may limit its capacity to act effectively and coherently, at the same time, these constraints may create opportunities for migrant-sending countries to more effectively forward their own migration agendas. A case study of the EU's relations on migration with Senegal and Ghana evidences some important trends emerging in the EU's relations with migrant-sending countries. The increased priority of migration issues on the EU agenda as well as the realisation that migration can only be effectively managed in joint cooperation with sending countries, has given some African governments a new scope for influence in forwarding their agendas. As such, the migration issue has arguably given Africa a more strategic position vis-à-vis the EU.

* The author would like to thank the University of London Central Research Fund and the Department of International Relations (LSE) for providing part of the funding to necessary to conduct interviews in Accra, Brussels, and Dakar. The author also thanks Dr. Karen E. Smith for providing comments and suggestions on an earlier draft.

Please do not quote or cite without the author's permission. Contact the author (t.van-criekinge@lse.ac.uk) for comments, questions, or suggestions.

The EU-Africa Migration Partnership:

An assessment of EU constraints and African leverage – a case study of Ghana and Senegal

Migration is an issue area which deserves due consideration in view of the developmental challenges that continue to face sub-Saharan Africa. Indeed, both on the EU and African side, there is an increased recognition that migration and development complement one another, and that only through a coherent and coordinated policy of joint migration management can the migration phenomenon be beneficial to both countries of origin and of destination. The recognition of the increasing importance of migration has spurred intensive and extensive dialogue between the EU and the African continent in particular. Due to the increased priority of migration issues on the EU-Africa agenda as well as the recognition that to manage both the negative and positive consequences of migration this needs to be done jointly between countries of origin and of destination, it is crucial to establish the extent to which the extensive and intensive migration dialogue has given some African governments a new scope for influence in forwarding their own agendas vis-à-vis the EU. The purpose of this paper is to explore the extent to which the EU's external migration policy has impacted its relations with Africa, with a focus on migrant-sending countries and regions in particular. The paper also considers a country case study of two West African countries, Senegal and Ghana, exploring the extent to which countries of origin have or have not been able to position migration policy towards one which engages with the countries' own migration agendas.

The first section of the paper overviews some of the major developments in the EU's approach to migration in relations with the ACP. It evidences that high-level dialogue particularly with Africa on joint migration management has become a priority item on the EU political agenda. Cooperation with countries of origin has intensified, coupled with increased technical and financial assistance for migration management, provisions on legal migration, as well as increased efforts to combat illegal immigration. The EU has sensitised African countries to the importance of the migration phenomenon, but at the same time, agendas can be characterised by diverging interests and concerns as regards migration. The next section contrasts the EU's migration agenda with that of Africa. Here the focus has largely been on making migration a positive tool for development. The African migration agenda has focused on four areas: remittances, mitigating the brain drain and encouraging brain gain, addressing the root causes of migration, and building domestic capacity and ownership in migration management. African governments generally agree with the need to coordinate migration agendas and have been willing to engage in dialogue provided this considers the concerns of *both* origin and destination countries. The last section analyses the EU's capacities and constraints in forwarding an effective and coherent approach to joint migration management

with migrant-sending countries. The EU is constrained on three levels, namely in terms of policy overstretch and funding and human resource capacities, policy coherence at the institutional level, and coordination and coherence amongst the supranational and intergovernmental levels of decision-making and policy implementation. These constraints lead to a policy of migration management which is often restrictive and limited. Although the EU has endorsed a balanced and comprehensive approach, in practise it has employed a carrot and stick approach to migration management by employing a combination of repressive measures and incentive mechanisms meant to induce countries of origin to comply with readmission and migration control. This has led many observers to argue that in practise the EU has employed a ‘coercive’ approach, as opposed to the more ‘open’ approach solicited and preferred by countries of origin. Regardless of the EU’s increased efforts in formulating an effective and comprehensive external migration policy, the institutional and political constraints it faces tend to weaken its effectiveness, and therefore the EU’s ability to fully forward its agenda in dialogue on migration management with countries of origin. The paper demonstrates that the increased strategic importance of migration as well as the necessity for joint cooperation has created a more balanced relationship in which both parties can make demands and concessions.

Migration in EU-Africa relations

The EU’s commitment to the concrete formation of a migration policy has grown significantly and rapidly since its initial formation in the Amsterdam Treaty.¹ Africa in particular has witnessed an increasingly intense dialogue and willingness from the EU to more closely engage in cooperation efforts geared at developing joint strategies on migration. The Cotonou Agreement, which in linking migration with development and inserting clauses on migration, brought the issue to the forefront of EU-ACP relations. The insertion of Article 13, the migration clause, was amongst the most contentious issues during the Cotonou negotiations, highlighting the weight and importance of the issue for both the EU and the ACP. Since Cotonou steps have been taken to institutionalise the external dimension of the EU’s migration policy, particularly in relations with Africa. In December 2002 the Commission released a communication examining the driving forces and root causes of migration and proposed to address these more closely by integrating migration into the EU’s external policies, with a particular focus on the link between development policy and migration (CEC 2002). Shocking events in Ceuta and Melilla in 2005, in which several unarmed African

¹ Since the 1997 Treaty on European Union (i.e. the Amsterdam Treaty) policies previously under the Justice and Home Affairs pillar, (illegal immigration, internal and external border controls, movement of non-EU nationals and refugees) moved to the Community pillar. As in all policies under the first pillar, the Commission has the sole right to propose legislation. Since 2004, decision-making power is shared between the Council and the Parliament, and decisions are made by qualified majority voting.

migrants were killed while attempting to surmount blockades surrounding the two Spanish enclaves in Morocco, prompted an intensification of dialogue on migration between the EU and Africa. In 2005 the Council adopted the *Global Approach to Migration*, prompting action in three key areas: strengthening cooperation and action between the Member States, increasing dialogue and cooperation with Africa and the Mediterranean, and promoting the creation of a framework for funding and implementation of a strategy on migration. In December 2006, the Council solicited intensification in the EU's efforts at establishing a comprehensive migration policy, which would include partnerships with key migration countries and regions (CEU 2006). Furthermore, a joint Action Plan was adopted in July 2006 at the regional Euro-Africa Ministerial Conference on Migration and Development in Rabat, outlining a series of repressive measures advocating stronger border controls in order to curb illegal migration, and the need to negotiate readmission agreements, as well as some incentive measures such as assistance in improving access to education, strengthening training opportunities for legal migrants, and a proposal for facilitating circular migration. The meeting was followed by a high-level EU-Africa Ministerial Conference on Migration and Development in Tripoli in 2006 where both sides agreed to step up efforts to tackle the root causes of migration by mainstreaming migration in to development strategies. A second conference took place in Paris in November 2008, in which a multi-annual programme of cooperation based on the three points of the global approach to migration, namely legal migration, combating illegal migration, and synergies between migration and development policy was agreed upon. A Partnership on Migration, Mobility and Employment, has also become one of the strategic priority areas under the Joint EU-Africa Strategic Partnership agreed in Lisbon in 2007, setting out an ambitious agenda for long and short term cooperation. Lastly, the *European Pact on Immigration and Asylum*, adopted by the Council in October 2008, yet again reaffirms the EU's commitment to creating comprehensive partnerships with countries of origin and transit.

Cooperation at the regional and individual country levels has also intensified. Migration issues have featured prominently on the EU-ECOWAS (Economic Community of West African States) troika agenda, as the regional body is considered to play a key role in developing a dialogue for cooperation between the EU and Africa, resulting in the setting-up of a working group on migration in May 2006. At the individual country level, the EU has sent diplomatic missions to key African countries to negotiate readmission agreements and secure cooperation in combating illegal migratory movements, based on Article 13. The dialogue has been led by Commission delegations and embassy staff of European Council Presidencies as well as interested Member States, and ideally covers, "a broad range of issues from institution and capacity building and effective integration of legal migrants to return and the effective implementation of readmission obligations, in order to establish a mutually beneficial cooperation in this field" (CEU 2005: 5). In 2006, the

first such missions were sent to Mali, Mauritania, and Senegal, and in 2007 further missions were sent to Cape Verde, Ghana, and Ethiopia.

Financial and technical assistance have also been established as important instruments to help sending countries in managing migration flows as well as in countering illegal migration. Migration-related funding has been incorporated into the European Development Fund (EDF). In 2006, €25 million was devoted towards the creation and funding of an intra-ACP Migration Capacity Building Facility for the management of south-south migration by financing capacity-building measures and cross-border programmes aimed at migrants and migration flows to and from ACP countries. Under the 10th EDF, ACP countries with a heavy migration outflow were required to integrate migration profiles into their Country Strategy Papers (CSP). Besides containing “information relevant to the design and management of a combined migration and development policy,” (CEU 2006: 34), these profiles set-out the process of discussions between EC delegations, interested Member States and the relevant authorities in the third countries, and help to identify priorities for funding migration-related activities and projects. Migration profiles have been integrated into 18 CSPs, while for five African countries, Cape Verde, Ghana, Mali, Mauritania and Senegal, migration has been directly integrated into the countries EDF funding schemes. Further to the EDF, several African countries and several projects geared at tackling migration issues have also received funding under the AENEAS scheme, providing specific and complementary financial and technical assistance to third countries in support of efforts to ensure more effective management of migration flows.

In the area of legal migration, the EU has taken steps to increasing access to the EU’s labour market. In this regard, the Commission has proposed selective migration schemes facilitating entry for migrants with specific skills in specific sectors. From 2007 to 2009 the Commission will propose a set of legislative measures facilitating legal entry and enforcing the socio-economic rights of four categories of migrants: highly-skilled workers, seasonal workers, remunerated trainees and intra-corporate transferees, while securing the legal status of already admitted migrants (CEC 2005b). In 2007, the Commission proposed the so-called ‘Blue Card directive’, which aims to recruit highly-skilled workers to the EU by offering a single work and residence visa, and the ‘Rights directive’, which aims to facilitate migrant integration by giving access to a range of socio-economic benefits (CEC 2007, 2007a). The EU has also been particularly keen on implementing measures to avoid the permanent establishment of third-country migrants, but encourage circular migration. The Commission Communication in May 2007 on *Circular migration and mobility partnerships between the European Union and third countries* is a clear indication of the EU’s intent on ensuring that legal labour migration is temporary. Furthermore, the *European Pact on Immigration and Asylum* acknowledges that legal migration provisions must take account of the

priorities, needs, and reception capacities of each of the EU's Member States (CEU 2008: 5-6). To this extent, circular migration is seen as benefiting both countries of origin and destination, by allowing for adjustments of migration flows according to the demands of Member States' labour markets, while simultaneously promoting transfer of skills and avoiding the brain drain by ensuring that legal migrants return home after their work experience (CEC 2007b; CEU 2008: 5). The Council has approved the creation of mobility partnerships with third countries, and is currently implementing pilot schemes in Africa and Eastern Europe.² These partnerships create a commitment by the EU to increase labour market access in addition to assistance on border security through Frontex, the EU's external border agency.

Increased political engagement on migration with Africa has been coupled with an increased use in security instruments to fight illegal immigration. Since 2005, Frontex has carried out studies on surveillance systems and risk analysis reports on African migratory routes, as well as implementing several border patrolling missions mostly in West Africa. Additionally, in 2006 the Rapid Reaction Mechanism (RRM), an instrument which allows the EU to respond urgently to the needs of countries which are threatened with or undergoing severe political instability or suffering from the effects of a disaster, was employed in Senegal and Mauritania. Further to this, in July 2008, the EU adopted the Returns Directive, allowing Member States to detain illegal migrants for up to 18 months and impose a five-year ban on their return (EP 2008). The directive was approved by both the Council and the European Parliament in 2008, representing the first major piece of legislation on migration passed by the co-decision procedure. Member States now have two years to implement the directive into national law. Lastly, the recent *European Pact* has made the EU's commitment to fighting illegal immigration all the more evident, where two of the five priority areas for action concern border controls and readmission and return of illegal migrants (CEU 2008a).

The increased high-level dialogue between the EU and Africa, as well as the various policy initiatives being discussed undoubtedly indicate the EU's interest and intent on working in cooperation with countries of origin and transit in jointly regulating and managing migration (Gnisci 2008: 85). The intensification of the EU's efforts on the continent and the gradual building-up of a concrete framework for cooperation and action, has also placed increased pressure on African governments to consider how migration affects the continent. Although the placing of migration issues on the African agenda has largely been spurred by European efforts, at the same time the interests and issues of concern between the EU and Africa are somewhat divergent. Indeed, the African approach to migration has focused on enhancing the potential positive effects of

² In 2008, pilot programmes were launched with Cape Verde and Moldova, with similar schemes to be launched in Senegal and Georgia (CEU 2008).

migration on development, while minimising its negative effects. Instead the EU has tended to use a carrot and stick approach in migration management with Africa, highlighting its interests in migration control through closer engagement with sending countries.

The African migration agenda: making migration work for development

With the growing interest on the EU side to place migration issues high on the agenda, the African side too has begun to consider migration as an important element to be considered. Many African governments now accept that migration cannot be seen in isolation of their developmental efforts, and as such, policies are seen as needed in order to ensure that migration does indeed contribute to development (Zoomers *et al.* 2008: 2). Indeed, as migration from developing to developed countries is on the rise, it is crucial to understand just what type of effect this has on the development prospects of sending countries, as “a growing consensus is now emerging that, although migration does not automatically lead to favourable effects, it can contribute to development and poverty reduction, provided an appropriate and consistent policy is pursued” (Zoomers *et al.*: 4). To this extent, the African migration agenda has focused on four major policy issues: remittances, mitigating brain drain and encouraging the brain gain, assistance in fighting root causes, and capacity-building in migration management.

Perhaps the most directly visible positive effect of migration on development is found in remittances, or the private transfer of funds migrants send home. Although in Africa official development assistance and foreign direct investment continue to represent the most significant flow of capital, remittances are steadily on the rise and tend to be less volatile. Indeed, in heavy migrant-sending countries remittances can positively contribute to development by reducing poverty, stimulating economic growth, and deepening financial development (Gupta *et al.* 2007). Yet the transaction costs of sending remittances are high, as is the risk of deportation in the case of irregular migrants, discouraging regular remittance flows while favouring the use of informal channels. In countries where remittances have come to constitute an increasingly important source of revenue, governments have placed the facilitation and institutionalisation of remittance flows high on the national migration agenda.

Secondly, the African migration agenda has focused on encouraging the positive link between migration and development through potential gains in human capital and promoting economic growth. Certainly, migration is a temporary ease on unemployment strains due to the departure of surplus labour (OECD Development Centre 2007: 60-61; Adepaju 2008: 26). However, the long-term loss of skilled migrants specialised in sectors of particular relevance to development has led to ‘brain drain’ becoming a particular problem for sub-Saharan Africa, where

the rate of university graduates who have migrated to Europe is higher than any part of the world (Katseli *et al.* 2006: 19). The loss of skilled professionals can mean the loss of productivity and knowledge, a loss of return on investment in training and education, and a loss in potential revenues. Furthermore, the brain drain adversely affects mainly the health and education sectors through the loss of key professionals, making the delivery of critical social services difficult (OECD Development Centre 2007: 70-71). African governments have begun exploring ways in which to encourage migrants to return and contribute to the developmental efforts in the country of origin. Circular migration schemes, aiming to ensure that migration remains temporary and mitigate the negative effects of the brain drain, are also very high on the agenda.³ Return and circular migration are seen to contribute to the ‘brain gain,’ or knowledge transfers and the acquisition of social capital. Indeed, where temporary migration, or ‘brain circulation’ is ensured, return migrants bring new skills, information, and technologies, which in turn contribute to stimulating economic growth through enterprise-creation and investment (Xenogiani 2006: 21). Brain gain is also stimulated through increased engagement with the diaspora, which facilitates the forging of trade, investment and development links between origin and destination countries. Indeed, involving the diaspora in development processes is yet another item of high importance on the African migration agenda. Not only do diaspora networks contribute to economic development, they are often also very participative in political advocacy, charity and cultural exchanges (Adepoju 2008: 33). Government outreach programmes geared toward the diaspora are seen to build confidence between the migrants and the state, enhance links between the two and ensure development.

Thirdly, in addition to the focus on making migration work positively for development, migrant-sending countries in Africa have also demanded more assistance in tackling ‘root causes’ which act as the main ‘push factors’ for migration, including poverty, unemployment, political and economic instabilities, overpopulation, and environmental disasters. Assistance in the creation of increased employment opportunities in the country of origin and schemes providing incentives for potential migrants to stay through higher wages and better working conditions have played an important role in requests for migration-related assistance. Furthermore, because in most African countries migration has just recently been placed on the development agenda, and because institutional capacity required to manage migration and formulate and implement migration policies is relatively weak, governments have also been keen on cooperation in capacity-building and training of officials to manage migration better at the domestic level (Adepoju: 40). African governments have recognised the need to better engage in migration management as a joint effort with destination countries. The need to coordinate migration initiatives and policies amongst

³ These schemes thus aim to address labour shortages in destination countries, while at the same time managing irregular migration flows through the creation of regular, albeit mostly temporary, channels of entry for potential migrants.

relevant stakeholders in the country of origin, as well as institutionalising information exchanges and dialogue with destination countries is considered necessary for better management of migration flows.

With managed migration bringing potential developmental benefits to Africa, it should come as no surprise that in cooperation with destination countries, African governments have focused on the positive benefits of migration. Migration management and the migration-development nexus are thus acquiring increased salience on the African political agendas. At the all-ACP level, the 2006 Brussels Declaration and Plan of Action outlined the ACP's commitment to developing migration dialogue with the EU, as well as identifying the need for a holistic approach to migration. At the pan-African level, since 2006 the African Union (AU) has started to develop a common position on African migration policies and has participated in migration dialogue and initiatives with the UN and the EU. The AU position, which was also presented at the EU-Africa meeting in Tripoli, emphasised the challenges migration poses for the continent, providing guidelines for member states to implement common measures advocated by national, regional, and international bodies (OECD 2008: 97-98). The framework focuses on the development aspect of migration, advocates the creation of employment opportunities in order to stem the brain drain and mobilisation of the African diaspora, and recognises the need to work together with countries of destination in order to combat irregular migration flows. Lastly, at the regional level several economic communities have formalised migration management dialogue. East Africa has only very recently begun regional dialogue on migration, by holding its first-ever workshop on migration in May 2008. The region aims to launch a Regional Consultative Process on migration between Inter-Governmental Authority on Development (IGAD) countries of East Africa as well as strengthening cooperation on migration with North Africa. The process was initiated namely under the auspices of the AU's migration framework and the EU-Africa migration dialogue. The Southern African Development Community (SADC) established the Migration Dialogue for Southern Africa in 2000, in order to facilitate regional cooperation and dialogue on migration. According to many observers however, this initiative has made limited strides in going beyond the rhetoric and developing concrete regional policy actions (Oucho 2008: 66). The West African region, and more specifically the ECOWAS, has taken the lead in Africa in developing a regional framework for migration management. In January 2008, at the ECOWAS Summit of Heads of State and Government the Common Approach on Migration was officially adopted, highlighting firstly the region's commitment to adopting a common legal framework and key principles on migration, and secondly setting out an action plan for implementing a common framework on migration and development. Although the formulation of the Common Approach was largely influenced by EU pressure on the region to develop a more coherent migration framework (Oucho: 96), the willingness of West

African governments to engage in migration dialogue at the regional level has also been driven by the recognition that prospects of successful regional integration are strongly linked to both the intra-regional and international migration dynamics of the West African region (Adepoju 2007). In the implementation of a proactive approach, ECOWAS has thus focused on the linkages between migration, development, and regional integration (OECD 2008: 106).

Migration has not only become a priority item on the EU's agenda, but similarly, the African side has demonstrated an increased interest in migration issues. Although there are some differences in the various emerging agendas on the continent, as outlined in a recent OECD study (Gnisci 2008: 106), some common factors characterise the African migration agendas: The role of EU/European influence in the formulation of an African migration agenda cannot be understated, as increased salience of migration has taken place mostly "on the initiative of the receiving countries in the North" (Zoomers *et al.* 2008: 4), and as such, much of what is happening at the African level has been a reaction to increased pressure from the international community, especially Europe. Furthermore, the need to better coordinate and harmonise migration-related policies, country and regional frameworks, and international efforts at joint migration management, also features heavily on both agendas. The different African initiatives have also demonstrated a clear commitment to dialogue and cooperation amongst relevant stakeholders. Indeed, dialogue has become ever more frequent and intense, and in general, African governments have been willing to engage provided the dialogue considers the concerns of both origin and destination countries. That said, while there has been a considerable acceleration of both EU and African efforts in developing a strategy of joint cooperation, the initial years following the *Global Approach* can be characterised mainly by "agenda setting with Africa" (Bosch and Haddad 2007: 17), or rather much dialogue yet little concrete action. "By furthering dialogue and co-operation with African partners to implement the global approach, a consensus has emerged – theoretically, if not for the moment practically – on the strategy linking 'migration and development'" (OECD 2008: 85). As the next section will show, although the EU has indeed stepped up its efforts in implementing an effective external dimension of migration, certain institutional and political constraints weaken the effectiveness of the policy, and therefore the EU's ability to engage fully with countries of origin in migration management.

Transforming rhetoric into action? Constraints on policy effectiveness

Migration, and especially the external dimension of migration, is a policy area in which the EU faces clear limitations and constraints in its capacity to transform rhetoric and policy initiatives into action. Smith has cautioned that the EU is likely to limit its policy-making and implementation capacity due to 'overstretch' caused by "limited capabilities and institutional shortcomings,"

“modest budgetary resources,” and a potential overloading of “an ever increasing list of responsibilities” (2004: 67). The EU is constrained in its capacity to convert increased policy obligations into actual practise, causing for a weakening of policy objectives projected abroad. In the implementation of the external dimension of migration, the EU faces these constraints on three levels: in terms of policy overstretch and funding and human resource capacities, coherence amongst other external policies, and in coordination and harmonisation amongst the various levels of policy- and decision-making constituting the EU’s external relations. These constraints limit the EU’s effectiveness in migration dialogue and the implementation of policies in its relations with migrant-sending countries.

Overstretch and financial and human resource capacities

A very concrete constraint on the EU’s ability to engage in a coordinated and coherent migration policy towards Africa is found in the limitations on resources which it is able and prepared to employ in executing the policy. The increased salience of migration issues on the EU-Africa agenda calls for relevant funding and policy expertise in order take on this new profile, requiring both sufficient financial and human resources. Yet as Bosch and Haddad (2007) rightly point out, the provision of adequate resources can be a significant impediment to progress in effectively forwarding the external dimension of the EU’s migration policy.

This impediment is found firstly in the resources, financial and human, being invested in the policy at the EU level. Indeed, “progress can only be made if there are adequate resources. This is the case for the Commission, but also for Member States, and includes particularly EC Delegations and Member State embassies where officials frequently have to cover a whole range of issues in addition to migration” (Bosch and Haddad: 16). Although delegation staff, for example, are expected to proactively engage in migration dialogue with African governments, the challenge in effectively implementing policy actions lies partly in allocating sufficient financial and human resources and time, as well as building-up relevant policy expertise in order to deal with an increasingly important profile (interview 2, 3, 1). Furthermore, migration-related programmes implemented in the countries of origin are mostly managed through intermediary agencies such as the International Organisation for Migration (IOM) or the United Nations Development Programme (UNDP) because of their policy expertise. Since African governments are therefore not directly working with the EU in migration matters, the EU is sometimes perceived as incompetent in handling the profile. Indeed, the Commission has acknowledged the EU’s limitations in migration management. In 2008 it proposed enhancing both expertise on migration management through the

creation of a support mechanism for the exchange of information, expertise and training of delegation and Member States embassies' staff (CEC 2008: 12).

For countries of origin to engage with the EU's migration initiatives, increased assistance dedicated to the migration and development field is essential, with the provision of long-term and substantial resources and effective financial instruments contributing to a coherent and effective policy. Indeed, early EU initiatives in Senegal, for example, were met disapprovingly on the part of the government largely because the development-related assistance could not be delivered because an appropriate funding instrument had not yet been established (interview 5, 7). On the one hand, increased resources are now being invested in the policy and migration-specific financing instruments have been set-up. The 2004-2008 budget for the AENEAS programme was €250M, while its follow-up programme (2007-2013) has increased the budget to €384M. Indeed, the Aeneas budget has been criticised as being too modest, and therefore having limited capacities in migration management (Roig and Huddleston 2007: 378). Furthermore, the 10th EDF has integrated financial instruments dedicated to migration in some West African CSPs. At the same time, as opposed to the extensive migration discourse found in some of the CSPs, migration-related funding is modest in comparison to other areas in which the EU is aiming to play an active role in the countries. Although Senegal's CSP, for example, claims migration is a dominant theme in EU-Senegalese relations, which the EU is committed to closer cooperation with the government, the migration profile was allocated €4M under the 10th EDF, less than 1 per cent of the country's total allocation. Further to this, some interviewees have noted that the lack of expertise at the EU level on migration matters (especially migration and development) is a major obstacle in creating a proper funding instrument for dealing with migration, while the instruments currently in place are considered limited and incomprehensive by some (interview 5, 7). The Commission is also aware that regardless of increased financial instruments dedicated to migration management, problems in coordination remain amongst the different Community funding schemes related to migration, namely the European Neighbourhood Policy and Development Cooperation Instruments, the Solidarity and Management of Migration Flows Programme, and the RRM (CEC 2008: 13).

Constraints due to limited resources and expertise also arise from geographic expansion of the policy. Although the *Global Approach* initially prioritised relations with the Mediterranean and Africa, since 2007 it includes Eastern and South-eastern regions bordering the EU, and extends cooperation with countries of origin as far as Asia and the Middle East. In October 2008, the Commission noted that, "countries like India, China, Vietnam, Sri Lanka and the Philippines, as well as the Middle East are becoming increasingly relevant for the EU's migration policy" (CEC 2008: 11), while also proposing to develop a structured migration dialogue with Latin America and the Caribbean. Certainly the most pressing migration movements towards Europe originate in the

Mediterranean, Africa, and along the EU's Eastern and South-eastern borders, guaranteeing that at least in the short-term the EU's concentration on these geographic areas remains. At the same time, extending migration management to adopt a truly global scope will no doubt require investing increased financial and human resources into the policy. Although geographic expansion is essentially in line with a more comprehensive global approach to migration, at the same time "such further broadening of the strategic horizon involves a risk of operational and financial overstretching" (Pastore 2007: 7), which in turn may undermine the EU's effectiveness in managing such a far-reaching policy.

Policy coherence for development and coherence with other external policies

As an area that overlaps with other EU policies with an external dimension, especially development, trade, and security, and for joint migration management with countries of origin to be effective, the EU considers coherence amongst relevant policies and policy-actors essential (CEC 2006: 4; CEC 2008: 12). Yet, although it is recognised that migration policies overlap with and complement other policies, coherence has at times been lacking. Trade policies and to a lesser extent development policies operate in separate policy spheres from migration, while the security, or justice and home affairs (JHA) policy field has instead adopted a leadership position in the formulation and implementation of the policy. The dominance of a JHA-led approach has led several observers to point towards an, "overwhelming presence of the 'security rationale' surrounding the debate concerning migration and development" (Chou 2006: 2-3). The institutional set-up within the Commission, firstly, perpetuates this security-oriented approach, and secondly, leads to policy incoherence and therefore a weakening of policy objectives abroad.

There are essentially two approaches which the EU can take in linking migration and development policies: either to "use development tools to reach migration goals such as tackling illegal immigration" or to "utilise migration tools such as legal immigration to achieve development objectives" (Carrera and Chou 2006: 141). Importantly, "the former represents a more 'coercive approach' restricting or conditioning development aid if certain non-EU countries do not comply with member states' requests on migration management and the readmission of illegal immigrants. The latter can be characterised as a more 'open approach', fostering 'brain circulation', circular migration and the positive effects of remittances" (Carrera and Chou: 141; see also Chou 2006). In 2005, the Council adopted the *Communication on Policy Coherence for Development* (PCD), stressing the need for improvement in the coherence between twelve non-aid policy areas, including migration, and the EU's development policy in order to meet UN Millennium Development Goals by 2015. Specifically, the EU sought to promote well-managed labour migration; improve

remittance flows; turn the brain drain into brain gain; promote responsible recruitment practises; diaspora engagement; and South-South migration management (CEC 2005: 15). The Commission's *Communication on Migration and Development*, released that same year, solicited similar actions, but added, "encouraging circular migration and facilitating return to the country of origin" as another priority area (CEC 2005a). In other words, in making migration policy more coherent with the EU's development policy, at least in rhetoric, the EU has taken an 'open approach' by promoting migration as a positive factor for development in sending countries.

Although the EU has certainly demonstrated a willingness to engage with countries of origin, the growing trend in the EU's approach towards Africa has been the combination of repressive measures and incentive mechanisms soliciting closer cooperation. Concessions in the field of legal migration have been coupled with enhanced cooperation in combating illegal migration as well as requiring countries to sign readmission agreements. The pilot mobility partnership schemes, for example, go beyond simply offering temporary labour market access and increased assistance, in that they also require countries to cooperate on readmission and in the fight against illegal migration. The EU's diplomatic missions to several African countries have also employed this approach, with dialogue intended to cover "a broad range of issues from institution and capacity building and effective integration of legal migrants to return and the effective implementation of readmission obligations," (CEU 2006a) as well as increased assistance and political engagement. The integration of migration profiles and readmission clauses in agreements with third parties as well as recent legislation on illegal immigration⁴ "enhances the EU's capacity to control and reduce unwanted immigration to its territory" (Lavenex 2002: 162). These control elements are further coupled with instruments to induce third countries to cooperate with the EU in the first place, in that, "trade and aid are increasingly made conditional on the reduction of push factors and the readmission of persons staying illegally in the contracting party" (Lavenex: 162). Others argue that the EU's approach has tended to be restrictive and weighted towards a politics of control (Boswell 2003; Cespi 2006; Chou 2006; Niessen 1999; Lavenex 2002, 2007; Lavenex and Kunz 2008; Pastore 2007; Sterkx 2008). Indeed, the *European Pact* clearly highlights the use of a carrot and stick approach, in that it aims to include clauses both on legal migration and development but also on controlling illegal immigration and readmission in EU-level and bilateral migration agreements concluded with countries of origin. The Pact has significantly strengthened the EU's efforts to fight illegal immigration, rather than more positively engaging in a broader framework for migration. It commits the EU to undertaking not just closer cooperation with sending countries, but it also to organising legal migration policies in accordance with each Member State's needs and

⁴ The first major piece of legislation on migration to pass by co-decision between the Council and the Parliament (July 2008), the Returns Directive deals exclusively with controlling illegal migration.

reception capabilities, to ensure that illegal migrants are sent back to their countries of origin or transit, and to increase the effectiveness of border controls (CEU 2008). “The Pact clearly heralds a more conservative approach to immigration [...] It looks at immigration policies through the prism of ‘control first’, making this more explicit than in the past. Of the five areas identified for action, just one concerns promoting access to the EU, and even this refers to preventing illegal and undesirable migration” (Collett 2008). Thus while on the one hand, the EU seemingly promotes a development-friendly approach to migration management with third countries, on the other hand, recent policy developments as well as the combined use of coercive and incentive mechanisms instead point towards a much more restrictive approach being adopted. This shows a lack of policy coherence with the EU’s development policy, which instead favours using foreign policy instruments, such as migration management in order to achieve development goals.

Another area in which policy coherence has been limited is in linking trade and migration. Labour market access provisions afforded in trade agreements are one way of offering increased legal migration opportunities to developing countries. This can be done through the liberalisation and regulation of a small subset of labour mobility, i.e. the temporary movement of persons across countries for the purposes of supplying services, also known as Mode 4 in the language of the GATS.⁵ Mode 4 provides possible developmental benefits to developing countries through an increased and facilitated circulation of labour, while the temporary nature of Mode 4 can reduce or prevent brain drain and encourage brain circulation. Yet partly due to the EU’s institutional set-up in trade and migration policies, migration has not been successfully integrated into the EU’s trade agreements with third countries. The non-integration of migration issues in the recent Economic Partnership Agreements (EPAs) between the EU and the ACP evidenced that the EU’s trade and migration policies operate in two very separate policy spheres (Van Criekinge 2009). On the one hand, although free trade agreements such as the EPAs have implications that go beyond trade, policy formulation and negotiations are headed by trade experts, without consultation of the migration experts.⁶ Furthermore, granting Mode 4 provisions in trade agreements, and indeed legal migration in general, is an area of ‘shared competence’ between the Commission and the Member States, and one for which unanimity is required in the Council. One very straightforward explanation for the lack of a comprehensive linkage between trade and migration policies is the insufficient level of competence afforded to trade negotiators in being able to give concessions in

⁵ Mode 4 only covers persons seeking access to foreign labour markets within specific sectoral roles, but not those seeking general access, nor does it apply to persons outside of the service sector or to those seeking permanent employment. Although the temporary movement of persons cannot be equated with international migration *per se*, as “it has none of the cultural, social or political dimensions that are associated with international migration ... its direct economic consequences are essentially those of migration” (Winters 2003: 4).

⁶ In the case of the EPA negotiations, DG Trade took a leadership position, with limited contact with relevant actors in other policy fields and other DGs (Baldwin 2006; Hudson 2006: 63-64).

areas which go beyond trade policy and instead impinge on other policy areas such as migration. At the same time, this also leads to incoherence between complementary policy areas.

The limited link between trade and migration can also be attributed to reluctance from the migration policy field to expand beyond the traditional security framework in terms of coherence, formulation and implementation of the policy. Indeed policy making in the migration field continues to be dominated largely by the JHA branch with limited attempts at better coordination with other relevant policies. Even in light of the changing discourse on migration through such developments as the *Global Approach*, mobility partnerships, and increased political dialogue with sending countries, the EU has continued to focus on migration control mechanisms rather than overcoming obstacles for greater policy coordination (Lavenex and Kunz 2008). To this extent, “barriers towards greater policy coordination are sustained by the institutional set-up of policy-making in the EU” (Lavenex and Kunz: 453). The external dimension of migration is governed mainly by the High-Level Working Group (HLWG) on Migration and Asylum within the General Affairs and External Relations Council (GAERC), and is largely composed of JHA officials, thus perpetuating command of the migration field by one policy group and posing as a barrier for more closely linking migration to its development component and other complementary policies (*Ibid.*: 453-54; Chou 2006: 17).⁷ Furthermore, according to Pastore, “[migration and development] policies in Europe are marked since an early phase by a certain strategic fuzziness, by intrinsic political ambiguities, overlapping competences, policy incoherencies and bureaucratic competition (including, at European level, turf battles within the European Commission)” (2007: 3). Indeed, a study on the PCD one year after its implementation, found that coordination on migration policy amongst the relevant DGs has often been insufficient. The Commission’s justice branch (DG JLS) took a leadership role in the formulation of a migration and development policies, often without adequate consultation with DG DEV on development, or DG RELEX, on external policy coherence (Egenhofer *et al.* 2006: 28; Sterkx 2008: 127). Therefore, “from the JHA perspective, the underlying logic is to use external cooperation as a means of achieving asylum and migration goals, in particular the improved management of migration flows and the fight against illegal immigration” (Sterkx: 127). This is sharply in contrast to the development- or policy coherence-oriented perspective, where the purpose is not to achieve migration goals through migration management and control, but rather to achieve development goals through migration management, or policy coherence through migration management in coordination with other policy areas.

⁷ Established in December 1998), the HLWG’s main task is the implementation of cross-pillar programmes in the main countries of origin and transit. It has a leading role in the EU’s migration policies with an external dimension (CEU 2002; Lindström 2005).

As long as migration continues to be seen mainly as a security issue rather than a development one, the link between migration and other complementary policies such as trade and development is likely to be limited. Furthermore, the fact that at the practical level migration has remained embedded in the security field rather than being effectively linked to other relevant policy fields evidences incoherence between stated policy objectives and actual policy implementation. Lastly, the dominance of a security-oriented approach in the external dimension of migration constrains the EU's capacity to engage fully with countries of origin in migration dialogue, largely because the EU's interests and policy objectives diverge from those of the countries of origin, which are instead seeking a more 'open' approach to migration management.

Coordination and harmonisation in the EU's external relations

While Member States can agree on the benefits of developing a common migration policy or a common position on the external dimension of migration, separate national policy agendas restrict or constrain the development of an effective and practical policy at the EU level (interview 7, 5, 4; Sterkx 2008: 126-28). This is so because although in some areas the EU's migration policy is becoming increasingly communitarised, EU Member States have kept a firm grip on the externalisation of the policy, especially in relation to managing migration in cooperation with third countries. This has created tensions between the supranational and intergovernmental levels of policy making and implementation in the EU's external dimension of migration. These tensions, in turn, limit the EU's ability to promote its policy objectives abroad, as policy incoherence and a lack of coordination between the different levels has weakened the potential effectiveness of policy initiatives.

Firstly, policy coherence has suffered not only because of particular institutional problems faced at the EC level, but perhaps more importantly because of the Member States' role in shaping the policy according to their preferences. Indeed, as one study observed:

Policy coherence between member states and the different instruments and DGs of the European Commission is at times lacking. This is particularly true on issues like migration, for which there are considerably contrasting policy agendas between justice and home affairs ministries and external relations and development ministries. [...] The crucial determiners of European migration policies, however, remain the member states. It is the member states that have provided the main impetus for the incorporation of migration policies into EU external relations (Higazi 2005: 5).

Not only do Member States steer policy orientations, their approach has also tended to be geared towards security and migration control. According to Sterkx (2008), Member States have pushed for a JHA-oriented approach to migration rather than for policy coherence in external cooperation, evidencing their concern first and foremost with migration management for the purposes of

migration control. This is to the disadvantage of the Commission's preferences, where DG DEV and RELEX have generally expressed discontent with the JHA authority over the migration agenda, which is seen to undermine policy coherence (Sterkx: 126-127; Lavenex 2007; Boswell 2003: 632-635). Commission interviewees confirm that, in general, Member States have adopted a much more restrictive approach towards third countries as opposed to the Commission, leading to a constant struggle for compromise on how the policy should progress, and to what extent it should adopt a 'coercive' as opposed to an 'open' approach (interview 2, 3, 1). While the EU's objective has been to pursue "a rather innovative (at least on paper) common migration policy compared to the tradition of its member states," by soliciting a comprehensive approach, in effect, the policy "has encountered considerable difficulties in shaking off the prevailing approach at the level of its Member States, which often manifests itself in an opposite manner, that is, as biased towards restrictiveness and weighted towards controls, sectoral, reactive and essentially unilateral" (CeSPI/SID 2006: 5). Indeed, Gnisci reiterates this point well, when she writes that, "the EU's global approach seeks to be integrated, balanced, negotiated and consensual. It shows that migration is now one of the strategic domains of negotiation between the Community and third countries. From the operational perspective, however, the 'control' issue is overriding and liberating national agendas from it is often difficult" (2008: 85).

Secondly, delegating competence in migration matters onto the EU level is delicate because of the careful balance struck between cooperation amongst Member States and between Member States and the Commission on the one hand, and maintaining national sovereignty over migration matters, on the other (Brady 2008: 18). Indeed, while cooperation and coherence in migration policy is encouraged, some Member States remain hesitant in delegating further competence to the Commission.⁸ Even Member States considered the main architects of the EU's emerging external migration policy (namely France, Spain, and to a lesser extent, the Netherlands and the UK), have nevertheless continued to operate separate bilateral migration schemes and policies. This bilateral element has led to concern that EC efforts in cooperation with third countries are duplicated or surpassed, and to some extent even undermined (interview 3, 5, 8, 7; Sterkx: 126). Sterkx notes that although the Commission has been given a mandate to negotiate readmission agreements with third countries on behalf of the EU, at the same time Member States have continued conducting bilateral talks with countries from which they receive a considerable influx of migrants. Accordingly, "third countries do not understand this situation of parallel negotiations, and take advantage of it, which often results in the deferral of Community negotiations" (126). This overlap of efforts in third countries goes further than readmission agreements, and extends into the EU's efforts at becoming

⁸ For example, in the formulation of a common migration policy, Denmark has an opt-out, and therefore does not participate in decision-making, while the UK and Ireland participate only on a case-by-case basis.

more active in migration and development. A limited set of EU countries, namely France, Spain, and to lesser extent Italy, are managing African migration flows by instituting ‘second-generation migration agreements.’⁹ These agreements apply a carrot and stick approach to managing migration flows. Sending countries are given labour access, financial or technical assistance, or investment opportunities, in exchange for their cooperation in fighting illegal migration and readmission. Bilateral agreements thus address both the individual Member States’ labour needs as well as some of the root causes of migration in sending countries, while providing incentives for closer cooperation in controlling irregular migration (Panizzon 2008). Yet although this approach is similar to the EU’s, coordination between the Member States and the Commission (or in this case the Delegation) is often inadequate. This perpetuates an image of the EU as unable to adequately deal with migration matters, as opposed to individual Member States, whose bilateral efforts are seen as more active and prepared to engage on migration (interview 7).

A lack of coordination weakens the effectiveness and strength of the EU’s total efforts in third countries. As Sterkx rightly points out:

The premise of [the EU] is that external actions need to be coherent in order to have any impact. If not, the position of the EU vis-à-vis third countries will be substantially weakened. However, the starting point of external action on asylum and migration is a division of competencies across several policy areas, a varied degree of communitarisation, and different perspectives on how to achieve policy coherence. [...] This reality causes overlap and cultivates a struggle for policy ownership which, in the end, is likely to damage the coherence and firmness of external action. (Sterkx 2008: 125)

Coherence and coordination in the EU’s external dimension of migration is undermined firstly because of, “the exclusion of key institutional actors who prefer the comprehensive approach from the decision-making process [...] and] the isolation of decision-making power within an institutional setting which favours the coercive strategy” (Chou: 3). Inadequate consultation on the part of the JHA branch with other relevant policy actors (namely those in development, trade, and external relations) has led to the dominance of a restrictive and limited approach. Furthermore, tensions between the supranational and intergovernmental levels have led to further perpetuating a security-oriented approach over a more comprehensive approach to joint cooperation on migration with countries of origin. The fact that Member States have continued operating migration policies at the bilateral level while the EC-level remains inadequately equipped to deal with the profile further undermines the total EU effort in the formulation of an external dimension of migration. Therefore, in the formulation of a migration policy the EU faces constraints in its interactions with third countries that limit its capacity to act effectively and coherently. At the same time, these constraints

⁹ As opposed to ‘first-generation’ schemes which can be classified mainly as guest worker programmes or working-holiday makers schemes.

have created opportunities for migrant-sending countries to more effectively forward their own migration agendas.

Joint migration management: An opportunity for sending countries?

In relation to the diverging interests between African and the EU in migration management in addition to the constraints faced by the EU, it becomes relevant to question whether the EU's coordination and coherence gaps, have provided migrant-sending countries increased scope to steer policies away from a purely restrictive framework, towards one which more considers country concerns more closely. This last section will explore this issue through a brief comparative case study of Ghana's and Senegal's relations with the EU in the migration field. The migration phenomenon faced by each country has significantly reshaped their relations with the EU. Aside from Nigeria, Ghana and Senegal experience the highest migrant outflow (both regular and irregular) in the West African region, with most migrants headed for Europe (de Haas 2008: 24, 29). Both governments are increasingly aware of both migration's negative effects, as well as its potential to positively affect development. Largely on Europe's initiative, the countries are now engaging in migration dialogue with the EU and relevant Member States. That said, the approaches that each country has adopted, and more importantly, in forwarding its own preferences and demands onto the EU have proven quite different, resulting in two different frameworks for joint migration management.

Senegal

Since the late 1990s, migration flows from Senegal to Europe have increased rapidly, with both Spain and Italy, experiencing a significant influx of migrants. Stricter controls along the overland routes, positioned Senegal both as a country of origin and transit, with a significant number of non-Senegalese migrants transiting through Senegal in order to depart from the Senegalese coast towards European shores (Spaan and van Moppes 2006: 14). Aside from illegal migration, consisting mainly in the departure of unskilled migrants, 17 per cent of Senegal's high skilled labour force resides abroad and contributes to the country's brain drain. The Senegalese government's migration agenda has a strong orientation towards the migration-development nexus, by focusing primarily on the potential positive effects of migration, such as remittances or diaspora engagement, and brain gain through migrant return (interviews 7, 5; Ndione and Broekhuis 2006). According to Wabgou, "Senegal is one of the few countries in sub-Saharan Africa to have addressed the migration of its people as a foreign and public policy issue and to have started dealing

with these migratory flows as a global reality in Africa, Europe and America. Across the country, the government has begun taking steps to promote migration policies, and to improve cooperation in migration management” (2008: 141).

The EU began its interactions with Senegal by pushing a migration agenda oriented largely towards migration control rather than migration and development, or even joint migration management. In May 2006, the EU mandated the Commission to send its first diplomatic mission to Senegal in order to initiate dialogue under Article 13. Although the Agreement had been signed and ratified in 2001, the sending of the mission nearly five years later was highly indicative of the interests of the EU in dealing with migration issues in Senegal, as the mission was sent in the same year that Europe was facing an extreme migration influx from Africa, with West Africa, and Senegal in particular, positioned as a major point of origin and transit for clandestine migration. The EU’s initial efforts there were concentrated on controlling this influx of mostly irregular migrants and seeking cooperation from government in averting departures before reaching European territory. Under the initiative of Spain, the EU deployed the first Frontex missions in Senegalese waters in September 2006 which have continued to operate well into 2009. Closely following the Frontex mission was the decision to implement the Rapid Reaction Mechanism (RRM) in April 2007, signalling the first time this emergency instrument was used to provide assistance related to tackling illegal migration (CEC-IOM 2007; Panizzon: 29-30). In addition, from 2004 to 2006 the AENEAS programme funded several projects in Senegal that aimed to reinforce regional dialogue on irregular and transit migration, strengthen border management systems and the capacity of law enforcement and prosecution authorities in fighting and preventing irregular migration, raise public awareness on migration, assist in developing national policies to combat irregular migration, promote voluntary return and reintegration (CEC 2007). Although the Aeneas projects strike some balance between migration control and management, it is nevertheless evident that the migration-development nexus was not prioritised, in that all of the projects included an element of migration control.

The initial phase of the EU’s migration dialogue and policy actions with Senegal therefore took a significant orientation towards migration control and combating illegal immigration. To this end, the initial dialogue between the two sides can be characterised as negative, with progress being slow and difficult (interview 5, 3, 7, 1). On the one hand, the EU considered the Senegalese government as largely uninterested in the dialogue, especially with regards to managing irregular migration, thus making initial engagement limited. Secondly, an internal power struggle within the Senegalese government over which ministry would be in charge of migration policies, i.e. the Ministry of Interior or the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, made it unclear with whom dialogue should be conducted, thus minimising the impact of migration-oriented initiatives. Thirdly, the limitations

in the dialogue were also partially due to the EU's own constraints in undertaking a migration agenda. In this sense, the EU delegation on the ground, which was given the task of following-up on the dialogue lacked capacity, expertise and human resources necessary to effectively and successfully manage the migration profile (interview 3, 1). On the other hand, the Senegalese side perceived the EU as having initiated dialogue without adequate concern for the government's interests. For example, the initial use of the RRM, although deemed largely successful by both the EU and Senegal, was also met with criticism. The RRM was employed as a short-term financing instrument almost immediately following the initial dialogue, after which EC Development Commissioner Louis Michel assured the government that funding would be provided in order to assist in migration management. This assurance was made however without a long-term funding mechanism in place which could be immediately employed, hence the use of the RRM. Yet because the RRM is an emergency instrument, its initial employment was perceived to undermine the government's own capacity in managing migration (interview 5, 7). Furthermore, initial dialogue under Article 13, was also considered to be tense and difficult, with the Commission unilaterally soliciting the signing of such an agreement without an adequate incentive mechanism in place for Senegal to benefit from an EU-wide readmission policy. This led to a series of difficult negotiations between the Commission and the Foreign Affairs Ministry regarding which migrants should be considered for readmission (namely only Senegalese nationals or including transit migrants). The Senegalese government has resisted the inclusion of non-nationals in readmission agreements, unless capacity is enhanced in order to effectively manage a large influx of repatriated migrants (interview 7). To this day, readmission negotiations between the EC and Senegal are ongoing.

Although dialogue can be characterised as tense, with policy developments and initiatives being difficult to negotiate and implement, most recently a shift in the dialogue as well as acceleration in positive engagement with the government's migration strategy has taken effect (interview 4, 5, 3). In September 2007, the EU and Senegal released a joint declaration following the conclusion of the fourth migration dialogue meeting since 2006, indicating a definite shift in the scope of the dialogue by considering legal migration, the nexus between migration and development, and domestic capacity-building. Recent policy initiatives have also demonstrated a closer convergence of agendas between the EU and Senegal. In June 2008, the Council mandated the Commission to commence negotiations with the government on an EU-wide mobility partnership (CEU 2008). The mobility partnership essentially operates on incentive-based mechanisms, by, for example, granting increased labour market access in exchange for cooperation in fighting illegal immigration. At the same time it represents a shift from a purely unilateral control-oriented approach because it aims at joint cooperation in making migration a positive factor for development by facilitating measures on legal and circular migration between the country and

those Member States interested in participating in the scheme. The evolution of the dialogue is also evident in the intervention strategy adopted for sub-Saharan Africa concerning financial programming from 2007 to 2010 for the programme replacing Aeneas. According to observers, between 2007 and 2008, the migration dialogue between Senegal and the EU has indeed moved from a purely migration control-oriented agenda, largely imposed by the EU, to one which more closely considers Senegal's concerns and interests. Accordingly, negotiations on legal labour migration schemes; the multitude of dialogue; increased dialogue on thematic areas, not only control; increased funding for labour migration and circular migration; as well as engagement from Member States to negotiate labour migration deals with Senegal are an indication of this changing framework (interview 4). To what extent can this movement towards a more positive approach be attributed to the Senegalese government itself, and to what extent has this been EU-driven?

The evolution of the dialogue is characterised by increased Senegalese pro-activeness in establishing ownership over its migration phenomenon. The government has keenly focused on enhancing capacity in migration management rather than accepting the unilateral implementation of control mechanisms. Indeed, any Senegalese movement on cooperation in migration control is coupled explicitly with gains in areas related to migration and development, legal and labour migration, and/or domestic capacity-building. Senegalese pro-activeness has been manifested in two main ways. Firstly, in recognising the EC's constraints in migration management, the government has preferred to more closely cooperate at the bilateral level with specific Member States whose engagement more closely fits the Senegalese migration agenda. The intensification of bilateral cooperation has provided a basis upon which Senegal's cooperation at the EU-level has been re-orientated towards a more comprehensive framework for joint migration management. Secondly, the government has developed an awareness of its own strategic position within the framework of EU cooperation on migration. The Senegalese government is therefore conscious that migration has given it an improved scope for influence and has begun using dialogue and negotiations as an 'instrument' for shifting policies closer to its own national agenda (interview 5; IRIN 2006).

While the EU is seen as an extremely important and critical player in the country, and engagement is considered necessary for development, at the same time, Senegal is aware that the so-called weaknesses of the EU can limit or constrain effectiveness. Awareness of these constraints in implementing an effective migration policy in Senegal has allowed the government to more overtly forward its own preferences. The government argues that it has been difficult to move forward the dialogue due to the continual evolving nature of the EU's migration policy; the Senegalese side is convinced that without a coherent or unitary EU policy on both legal and illegal migration, progress can be only limited. Secondly, there is a strong conviction that the EU is unable to adequately deal with the reality of migration issues facing the country. The government considers

the Commission ill-equipped in dealing with the migration profile. Procedures are described as long and bureaucratic, and misinformation between the delegation and Brussels headquarters is manifest. Secondly, the delegation of project implementation to external agencies or intermediaries such as the IOM has been perceived as failing to strengthen the capacity of the government (interview 5, 7). Thirdly, the image of this inability to adequately deal with the migration profile is further strengthened by the fact that intense Member State engagement has led to what has been perceived as an incoherent position on migration amongst the EU as a whole vis-à-vis the Senegalese government. Coordination between Member States and the Commission is seen as lacking. Each Member State active in the country is seen as pursuing its own bilateral interests and political agenda, which are often much more significant and appropriate in relation to the Senegalese agenda (interview 7, 5; Panizzon: 53).

Bilateral engagement on migration in Senegal is not a new phenomenon, but has intensified since 2006, with the signing of bilateral migration agreements between Senegal on the one hand, and France and Spain, on the other. These agreements employ an incentive-based strategy for migration management by offering increased labour mobility, development assistance, or legal migration opportunities, in exchange for cooperation on combating illegal migration. Already in 2000 France and Senegal signed a co-development convention, while in 2006 a more comprehensive Migration and Co-development Agreement was signed, linking the creation of channels for legal migration and development assistance with cooperation in the fight against illegal migration. In 2008, this agreement was further supplemented by a quota agreement, providing work permits to a number of Senegalese migrants. Spain has also been particularly active in migration cooperation with Senegal. In an effort to stem the heavy flow of increased illegal migration originating from Senegal, in 2006 the two governments signed an agreement establishing a link between control mechanisms, such as the deployment of Spanish forces in the Senegalese waters, and development, by offering technical capacity-building assistance, equipment, and increased labour access as an incentive for cooperation. With Senegal being the first West African country to engage so extensively at the bilateral level, this process “initiated an overall positive migratory dialogue for both Senegal and its counterparts in Europe” (Panizzon: 50-51).

The Senegalese case illustrates the extent to which Member States have remained the main drivers of the EU’s emerging external dimension of migration. Certainly, Member State leadership limits the EU’s movement on the migration front. Indeed, delegation staff has indicated that dialogue with the government has at times been difficult largely because progress is not possible without indication and approval from the Council. This inability to act autonomously, combined with the constraints in resources, has led to individual Member States adopting a much more proactive role in liaising with the government on migration (interview 3, 7). On the other hand,

Member States' bilateral efforts have also moved EU-wide dialogue with Senegal to consider a broader agenda, which converges more closely with the Senegalese migration agenda. Although Spanish and French efforts surpass the EU's capabilities in migration management, the comprehensive agreements are also expected to "pave the way for a future EU-wide migration agreement" (Panizzon: 2), with the mobility partnership agreement likely to assume similar shape and scope as the bilateral agreements. The intense bilateral cooperation on migration in Senegal therefore set an important precedent for further cooperation efforts in the country.

The Senegalese government has been keen to engage with Member States in their efforts in developing a comprehensive approach to migration management. By providing an alternative and more comprehensive means for the government to engage with destination countries in the face of limited progress at the EU-wide level, bilateral efforts contributed in re-orientating EU-Senegal relations on migration to more closely fit the government's preferences. The EU is often bypassed or undermined, because Member States are seen as more closely converging towards Senegal's interests in migration (interview 7). Bilateral cooperation has given the government further incentive to establish ownership over its migration phenomenon, and "affirmed the role of migration at the [Senegalese] political level" (Panizzon: 55). Although initially Senegalese interests in formulating a migration agenda were largely in response to external pressure, this has also provided a framework upon which the Senegalese government has come to base its understandings, expectations, and consequently its own policy agenda for joint migration management not just bilaterally, but also in cooperation with the EU. The government has developed an awareness of its own strategic position within the framework of EU cooperation on migration. It has interpreted increased interest from Europe as an opportunity from which the country can potentially benefit. The importance of the migration issue in Senegal's relations with Europe has allowed the government to use migration as a negotiation 'instrument,' by soliciting closer cooperation in exchange for shifting policies closer to its own national agenda (interview 5; IRIN 2006). The relationship is evolving from an imposed one, to one of 'give and take,' with movement in the fight against illegal migration possible only when the government can be expected to benefit in return for its cooperation (interview 3, 4, 5, 7). Senegal's pro-activeness, and even its success in shifting the migration agenda closer to its concerns, is thus linked to how it perceives both its own position in EU-Senegal relations, as well as how it perceives the EU's position as opposed to its own. To this extent, Senegal perceives its position within the migration debate as strategic, while at the same time, the EU is perceived as being constrained in the extent to which it can fully engage with the government, thus opting to engage more closely with other interested actors.

In the 1980s and 1990s Ghana moved from being mainly a country of immigration to one of emigration, mainly due to economic and political instability (Quartey 2006: 2-3). While the United States remains the primary destination for Ghanaians, the United Kingdom, Italy, the Netherlands, France and Germany also host a considerable proportion of Ghanaian migrants. Migration of high-skilled Ghanaians is a significant problem, yet Ghana also contributes to illegal migration mainly through unskilled migrants transiting through North Africa to reach Europe. Ghana is currently the second-largest sub-Saharan African contributor to migratory flows destined towards OECD countries, trailing just behind Nigeria (DELSA-OECD database 2004), thus qualifying as significant contributor to international migration flows. The government's position on migration prioritises the its developmental benefits, with level and importance of migrant remittances and increased diaspora engagement dominating the political discourse on migration. Furthermore, the government has expressed a clear intent on focusing on mitigating the brain drain through circular and temporary migration schemes, as well as encouraging return and reintegration of its high-skilled migrants. At the same time, the government also recognises that it has no clear policy on migration (CEC-Ghana 2006: 13; Anno-Kumi 2008; Anarfi *et al.* 2003: 32), and that better coordination amongst relevant stakeholders at the local, national and international levels is necessary. In view of making migration a positive factor for Ghana's development, the government has demonstrated a general willingness to cooperate with international partners in developing a relevant national migration agenda.

As part of the EU's efforts to send diplomatic missions to key migrant-sending countries in sub-Saharan Africa, the EU sent its first mission to Ghana in 2007. Initial dialogue between the government and the EU was characterised as geared largely towards migration control, with a view to encourage the government to negotiate and sign a readmission agreement (interview 8, 9; GNA 2007). Although the government notes that the opening of the dialogue was largely inimical to the country's interests, there was also an overall willingness and openness to engage in dialogue (interview 9). After an initially somewhat difficult start the dialogue became an apparent shift in the EU's approach to migration dialogue with Ghana was almost immediate, as reflected in the June 2007 Ghana-EU joint statement following the conclusion of the first round of discussions between the government and the EU. Both sides were said to be committed to developing a partnership in joint migration management by adopting a holistic approach and recognising that dialogue should become more systematic and regular in order to develop a more concrete and coherent framework for joint migration management (EU-Ghana 2007). Accordingly, at present an understanding exists

between the Ghanaian government and the EU that migration management can be mutually beneficial to both sides when managed effectively and coherently (interview 8, 9, 6, 2).

The EU has taken some specific actions on migration management in Ghana, mainly through employing financial assistance from the EDF and the general budget through the Aeneas programme. Migration has been integrated into the EC-Ghana 10th EDF Country Strategy Paper (CSP) for 2007-2010. Under the 10th EDF, Ghana was allocated €2 million under the title ‘Migration, Diaspora, and Security,’ which has an objective to “ensure that migration and human and financial resources of the diaspora contribute effectively to national development, minimising the costs of the ‘brain drain’ (particularly in the health sector) while maximising diaspora contributions. Increase the capacity of police and migration agencies for law enforcement while enhancing their accountability and respect for human rights.” The aim is to support the government, private sector, and civil society in carrying out these objectives through EC funding (CEC-Ghana 2006). The Aeneas programme also funds six projects in Ghana providing specific and complementary financial and technical assistance in order to support more effective management of migration flows. Four of these projects are the same as those implemented in Senegal, while two projects are exclusive to Ghana: one which aims to counter document fraud and assist in the fight against illegal immigration and one which assists in managing and facilitating remittance flows and solicits increased involvement from the diaspora in the country’s development.

Despite these actions however, ongoing migration dialogue and even policy actions have been rather limited between Ghana and the EU. Dialogue with the government has continued on the basis of Cotonou’s Article 8, namely political dialogue, rather than Article 13, which instead focuses exclusively on migration (interview 2). At present therefore, no dialogue exists specific to migration, but rather only within the context of political dialogue between the EU and Ghana, the ECOWAS, and Africa in general. Aside from a few instances of high-level dialogue, migration issues have been kept at a relatively low profile, with most of the discussions relating to the identification of funding opportunities and project formulation, and even that is often delegated to external agencies charged with project implementation. Furthermore, EC funding for migration has been rather modest. The €2 million for migration management in the CSP is significantly less than what other migrant-sending ACP countries (namely Cape Verde, Mali, Mauritania, and Senegal) received, and constitutes less than 0.5 per cent of Ghana’s entire allocation under the 10th EDF. Moreover, EDF financing for migration has yet to be implemented, with a feasibility study under way in 2008 and an actual financing decision expected in 2010. EU actions in Ghana in the migration field have therefore been far less intense with regards to dialogue, policy action and implementation than in Senegal. Why has such a limited framework developed in Ghana as opposed to Senegal?

The Ghanaian government considers that it has not yet taken full advantage of the increased interest demonstrated by external actors as well as the opportunities that migration offers for development. In order for migration to positively affect development, the government considers it must now take up the EU's initiative and implement it into national policy (interview 8, 9; Anno-Kumi 2008). Unlike the Senegalese case, the development of a joint migration framework between Ghana and the EU is not characterised by an increased pro-activeness on the part of the Ghanaian government to more closely align agendas or to establish increased ownership. Rather the process has largely been driven by pressure and pro-activeness from external actors, with the government adopting a cooperative and compromising approach to joint migration management. Three external sources have been identified as driving the Ghanaian migration agenda and dialogue; namely increased interest from the EU, some limited involvement from interested EU Member States, and positive and active engagement on the ground from international agencies such as the IOM and the UNDP. Aside from having largely shaped the migration issue in Ghana's dialogue with the EU, the extent of involvement of these three external sources alongside the limited pro-activeness from the Ghanaian government in shaping and driving the migration agenda explains why the scope for cooperation on migration management between the EU and Ghana has thus far remained narrow.

Although EU efforts are perceived as occasionally lacking in coherence (see below), at the same time, the EU is seen as a positive driving force behind sensitising the government on migration issues. To this extent, the government has not sought to bypass or surpass the EU's engagement in order to establish increased ownership, but rather, it has chosen to engage with the EU's initiatives and follow its lead. The EU is seen as a crucial actor in having created awareness at the African level, and in promoting the idea that migration can positively contribute to development when managed correctly and effectively (interview 9). At the same time, although the EU has been influential and even essential in initiating the migration debate in Ghana, the government also recognises that the EU is constrained by a rather narrow mandate for conducting dialogue. Although the government is aware that the dialogue has been fruitful and generally optimistic, issues in which the government is fundamentally interested in, such as increased labour migration opportunities or the creation of efficient temporary and circular migration schemes, go beyond the EU's competences. At the practical level therefore, the EU's role in implementing concrete initiatives and creating a working relationship with relevant national stakeholders has been limited and constrained to either providing funding opportunities, namely to external agencies, or supporting Member State initiatives (interview 8, 9, 6; CEC-Ghana 2006).

While the EU's role in Ghana has been somewhat limited, interested EU Member States instead have a larger scope for more intense engagement at the national level, since as demonstrated in the Senegalese case, migration management at the bilateral level can offer significantly more

incentives for cooperation. Indeed, bilateral efforts are also seen as having further sensitised the government on migration. Member State involvement in Ghana has been mostly positive, and largely concentrated on migration and development by furthering links with the Ghanaian diaspora or developing legal labour migration schemes. The Netherlands actively participated in the IOM's MIDA Ghana Health project, which aimed at the development of the Ghanaian health sector by soliciting skill transfers through temporary return assignments for the Ghanaian diaspora (IOM 2007), and also the UNDP in its efforts to develop a full programme to strengthen national capacity in migration (UNDP-GoG 2006). The United Kingdom has taken steps to facilitate remittance transfers by developing a remittance partnership with Ghana, as well as supporting the UNDP in drafting a national framework on migration (Dfid 2007; interview 9). The Italian government has co-sponsored IOM-coordinated projects focusing on migration and development. The MIDA Ghana project engages the Ghanaian diaspora in Italy in Ghana's development prospects through funding investment opportunities and skill transfer programmes. Furthermore the Aeneas project on labour migration between West Africa and Europe, also IOM-run, has resulted in the setting-up of a pilot job-matching database between Ghana and Italy in order to recruit 1000 Ghanaians according to their skills in the next coming years (interview 6, 2; Markwei 2008; Gallina 2007). Other Member States have instead been intent on negotiating readmission agreements with the government, this group includes namely Spain, and to a lesser extent Malta and the UK (interview 8, 9), or have focused more explicitly on illegal migration issues, such as Denmark, which funds an IOM-coordinated programme providing expertise and practical skills to Ghanaian law enforcement agencies, border guards, and judicial authorities (IOM 2008). The government has welcomed Member States engagement, seeing the combination of EU and bilateral interest as providing a good source of funding for migration-related projects and contributing towards the formulation of a national policy framework (interview 8, 9, 6). Yet, engagement has been limited, with bilateral efforts lacking in comprehensiveness, coordination, and intensity, and taking the form of a project-based approach, rather than overarching political agreements for cooperation. The different needs and priorities of Member States have led to a variety of initiatives being forwarded, but little concerted policy action at the bilateral level. Lastly, the intensity of bilateral engagement, as experienced in the Senegalese case, has also been lacking in Ghana, with most engagement occurring under the auspices of either the EU through for example, the Aeneas programme, or through the IOM or UNDP. This lack of intense effort to develop a comprehensive framework for bilateral migration management has constrained the possibility of Ghana asserting increased ownership or at least proactively engaging outside of the narrow framework for bilateral cooperation currently in place. Certainly if the Senegalese case serves as any indication, intense Member State involvement can offer an alternative means to establish more ownership over

migration policy vis-à-vis the EU, by creating an important precedent for future cooperation as well as increasing awareness of a country's strategic position in the migration debate.

While EU and bilateral efforts have contributed to the formulation of a national migration agenda, neither has taken a leadership role in the Ghanaian case. Rather this has been attributed to external international agencies that have been particularly active at the practical level in implementing migration-related and capacity-building projects in cooperation with the government. The IOM, and to a lesser extent, the UNDP, have worked in closest cooperation with the government in the formulation of policies and implementation of projects (interview 8, 6). The delegation of project implementation has strengthened the agencies' role in Ghana's migration debate, as they have worked closely with relevant national and international stakeholders on the ground, rather than merely at the level of high-level dialogue, agenda-setting, or project formulation. At the same time, delegating competences to external agencies has also contributed to the image of the EU as limited in its involvement in technical or hands-on cooperation with the government, with the other agencies instead seen as spearheading progress at the national level. Direct interaction with the government in terms of project implementation and the agencies' direct involvement in the formulation of a national strategy on migration have incidentally led to a recent increase in the government's engagement and pro-activeness in shaping its own national agenda. According to interviewees, the national migration agenda was exclusively pushed and driven by external actors, with increased engagement from the government observed only very recently. This increased willingness to engage on migration has been attributed to firstly, increased IOM and UNDP initiatives and pressure for the government to develop a national migration policy, and secondly, to the increased funding available which is said to have given the government an incentive to participate and motivated the development of national initiatives. Furthermore, observers have noted an increased willingness of outside actors to implement concrete measures on migration and development; thus aligning more closely with the government's interests in developing a migration agenda (interview 2, 6, 8, 9).

Thus while the EU is perceived as having positively contributed to sensitising African governments on the importance of migration, it is not considered to have spearheaded the formulation of a national position or policy. To this extent, the government has recognised that the EU only has a limited mandate to drive the migration debate in Ghana, leading to the EU being proactive and well-prepared in terms of high-level dialogue and agenda-setting, but much less so in terms of practical and applied work in the field or at the national level. Secondly, bilateral engagement from EU Member States at the national level has been limited in terms of establishing a comprehensive and overarching framework for cooperation on joint migration management, with efforts characterised as uncoordinated, narrow, and lacking in intensity. Arguably, without a broad

bilateral agreement providing a model for possible future cooperation at the EU-wide level, the Ghanaian government has not had the opportunity to either bypass or surpass cooperation at the EU level (were this in their interests), nor does it have the previous experience of negotiating and formulating a framework for joint migration management. Lastly, the limited roles attributed to the EU as a whole and individual Member States, have given way to other international agencies playing a much more instrumental role in formulating a national migration policy and incentivising the government to adopt more ownership over its migration phenomenon. The practical work of the IOM, and to a lesser extent, the UNDP, mostly in terms of project implementation and coordination, have required close cooperation with the government, and has consequentially led to the perception that these agencies currently lead national migration management efforts.

Two important conclusions can be drawn from Senegal's and Ghana's relations with the EU in the area of migration. Firstly, the case studies have evidence the extent of the EU's constraints or limitations in terms of capacity, policy coherence, and coordination. They brought to the forefront that at the domestic level of the countries with which the EU is seeking cooperation on migration management, the EU is limited in its capacity to fully engage with the government. This is so because, firstly, policy implementation is delegated to external agencies largely because of their expertise in managing migration in different domestic contexts. These capacity constraints in turn have an effect on the type of relationship that the EU is trying to establish in the country. As regards policy coherence, the case studies evidenced that the EU has started to move towards increased coherence between migration and development. At the same time, migration and labour policies are linked only insofar as this creates incentive mechanisms meant to induce countries to comply with joint cooperation in tackling irregular migration to the EU. To this extent, although the EU's approach towards migration management in Africa has indeed become more comprehensive, the field continues to be embedded in by a security-oriented approach in that the purpose is still migration management and control, rather than reaching development goals through joint cooperation and policy coherence. Lastly, as regards coordination, the multi-level structure of the EU constrains effective coordination amongst the different actors interested and active in the EU's emerging migration policy. The cases indicate that coordination and coherence is often lacking, and more importantly, these gaps have consequences on the effectiveness of the EU's policy objectives projected abroad. At the level of the delegations, both Senegalese and EU observers noted problems in communicating decision-making processes between Brussels to the delegation. Accordingly, such delays in policy decisions and implementation have contributed significantly to the Senegalese strategy of closer engagement at the bilateral level, as Member State engagement has been perceived as aligning more closely with Senegalese preferences and demands.

Secondly, the case studies evidenced how country's perceptions of the EU's capabilities and its constraints are important in shaping its position and strategies in the migration debate. In Senegal, the EU has been perceived as lacking in coherence and having a rather weak capacity to fully engage with the government in the migration agenda. This is seen as constraining the extent to which it can act as a positive force in shaping the migration agenda and negotiating with the government. For Ghana the EU is seen more positively, having played a crucial role in sensitising African governments to insert migration into national, regional, and continental debates and to integrate this into domestic development policies, but at the same time, limiting interaction in domestic policy making and implementation. Both countries' perceptions of the EU have in turn shaped their position in the migration debate. Senegal adopted a pro-active and strategic position in cooperating with other actors for closer collaboration, while Ghana adopted an accommodating approach in which it has willingly engaged in high-level dialogue with the EU, while the formulation of a national policy has been carried out alongside intermediary and external agencies specialised in migration matters, and which have worked in closer cooperation with the government in inserting migration into the Ghanaian national development strategy. The perception that the government holds of itself vis-à-vis the EU also contributes to the strategy that it chooses to adopt in relations with the EU. Indeed, the case of Senegal demonstrates that some African countries have been able to exploit this renewed strategic position vis-à-vis the EU evidencing just how this changing relationship has impacted the power dynamics between the two country blocs. As Senegal has come to perceive its position within the migration debate as strategic, it has not only strongly asserted ownership over its migration policy, but it has also been able to shift the migration dialogue to more closely consider the country's concerns and interests. Perhaps due its different geographic position, Ghana has not perceived its position as a major migrant-sending country to Europe as strategic, assuming a much more passive approach in the migration debate, even if this is seemingly starting to shift towards increased pro-activeness. Thus while in Ghana pro-activeness was a result of an increasingly closer alignment of agendas between the EU and the government, the opposite is true in Senegal, where pro-activeness instead resulted in closer alignment.

This paper has traced the evolution of the external dimension of the EU's migration policy towards Africa. It was argued that although the EU has become increasingly active in promoting and instigating dialogue and policy initiatives at the African level, at the same time EU and African interests in engaging in joint migration management do not always converge. Secondly, the paper also outlined the EU's limitations in fully engaging in migration dialogue and policy with external actors due to financial and capacity constraints, inadequate policy coherence amongst migration and other overlapping external policies, and a lack of overall coordination amongst the different

decision-making and policy implementing structures which comprise the EU's external relations. The paper also demonstrated that some African countries have been successful in making demands on the EU regarding joint migration management. In considering the EU's constraints in effectively forwarding its policy objectives on migration in the African context, it becomes evident that the increased awareness of some countries of these constraints has changed the dynamics of the EU-Africa relationship.

Bibliography

ACP Secretariat, *Brussels Declaration on Asylum, Migration and Mobility*, ACP/28/025/06 Final, and *Plan of Action for the Implementation of the Brussels Declaration*, ACP/28/026/06 Final (Brussels: 13 April 2006).

Adepoju, Aderanti, "Perspectives on international migration and national development in sub-Saharan Africa," in Adepoju, *et al.* (2008).

---, "Creating a borderless West Africa: constraints and prospects for intra-regional migration," *Migration Without Borders: Essays on the Free movement of People*, Pecoud, A. and de Gucheneire, P., eds., (New York/Oxford: Berghahn Books, 2007).

Adepoju, Aderanti, Tom van Naerssen, Annelies Zoomers, eds., *International migration and national development in sub-Saharan Africa*, (Leiden: Koninklijke Brill NV, 2008).

Anarfi, John, Stephen Kwankye, Ofuso-Mensah Ababio, Richard Tiemoko, "Migration from and to Ghana: A background paper," *Development Research Centre on Migration, Globalisation and Poverty Working Paper C4* (University of Sussex: December 2003).

Anno-Kumi, Adelaide, "Managing Labour Migration in Ghana," presented at the *Workshop on Migration and Economic Development in Africa*, (Dakar: 17-19 March 2008).

Baldwin, Matthew, "EU trade politics – heaven or hell?," *Journal for European Public Policy*, 13, 4 (2006): 926-42

Bosch, Peter and Emma Haddad, "Migration and Asylum: an integral part of the EU's external policies," *Forum Natolinskie*, 3, 11 (2007).

Boswell, Christina, "The 'External Dimension' of EU Immigration and Asylum Policy," *International Affairs*, 79, 3, (2003).

Brady, Hugo, "EU Migration Policy: An A-Z," *CER Briefing*, (London: Centre for European Reform, 2008).

Carrera, Sergio and Meng-Hsuan Chou, "Fiche on EU Migration Policy," in Egenhofer *et al.*, (2006).

CeSPI (Centro Studi di Politica Internazionale) and SID (Society for International Development), "European migration policy on Africa - Trends, effects and prospects," *Policy Paper for the Colloquium on Migration and Development in Africa - Scenarios and Proposals*, (2006).

Chou, Meng-Hsuan, "EU and the Migration-Development Nexus: what prospects for EU-wide policies?" *COMPAS Working Paper No. 37*, (University of Oxford: 2006).

Commission of the European Communities (CEC), *Communication on Integrating Migration Issues in the European Union's relations with Third Countries*, COM 703 final, (Brussels: 03 December 2002).

---, *Communication on Policy Coherence for Development - Accelerating progress towards attaining the Millennium Development Goals*, COM 134 final, (Brussels: 12 April 2005a).

---, *Communication on Migration and Development: some concrete orientation*, COM 390 final, (Brussels: 01 September 2005a)

---, *Policy Plan on Legal Migration*, COM 669, (Brussels: 21 December 2005b).

---, *Communication on the Global Approach to Migration one year on: Towards a comprehensive European migration policy*, COM 735 final (Brussels: 30 November 2006).

---, *Proposal for a Council Directive on the conditions of entry and residence of third-country nationals for the purposes of highly qualified employment*, COM 637 final, (Brussels: 23 October 2007).

---, *Proposal for a Council Directive on a single application procedure for a single permit for third-country nationals to reside and work in the territory of a Member State, and on a common set of rights for third-country workers legally residing in a Member State*, COM 638 final, (Brussels: 23 October 2007a).

---, *Communication on Circular Migration and Mobility Partnerships between the European Union and third countries*, COM 248 final, (Brussels: 16 May 2007b).

---, *Communication on Strengthening the Global Approach to Migration: increasing coordination, coherence and synergies*, COM 611/3 (Brussels: 08 October 2008).

Council of the European Union (CEU), “Modification of the terms of references of the High Level Working Group on Asylum and Migration (HLWG),” “A” Item Note from Permanent Representatives’ Committee to the Council, 9433/02, (Brussels: 30 May 2002).

---, *A Global Approach to Migration: Priority actions focusing on Africa and the Mediterranean*, 15744/05 (Brussels: 13 December 2005).

---, *Financing for Development and Aid Effectiveness: Delivering more, better and faster*, GAERC Conclusions, 8388/06, (Luxembourg: 11 April 2006)

---, *Brussels European Council Presidency Conclusions*, 16879/1/06 (Brussels: 14-15 December 2006a).

---, “Draft Joint Reply to Written Questions put by Agustín Díaz de Mera García Consuegra (PPE-DE),” Working Party on General Affairs, 16415/07, (Brussels: 11 December 2007).

---, *Council Conclusions on enhancing the Global Approach to Migration*, 2878th GAERC meeting, (Luxembourg: 16 June 2008).

---, *European Pact on Immigration and Asylum*, 13440/08 (Brussels: 24 September 2008a).

---, *Brussels European Council Presidency Conclusions*, 14368/08 (Brussels: 15-16 October 2008b).

CEC – Ghana , *Ghana Migration Profile*, (Accra: October 2006).

---, *Country Strategy Paper and National Indicative Programme for the period 2008-2013*, (Lisbon: 9 December 2007).

CEC – International Organisation for Migration (IOM), *Sénégal Migrations*, Bulletin d'information, n. 1, *Renforcement des Capacités de Gestion de la Migration et de Lutte Contre la Migration Irrégulière au Sénégal*, (April 2007).

CEC – Sénégal, *Document de stratégie pays et programme indicative national pour la période 2008-2013*, (Lisbon: 9 December 2007).

Department for International Development (Dfid), *Moving out of poverty – making migration work better for poor people*, Policy Paper (London: March 2007).

Egenhofer, Christian, Louise Van Schaik, Michael Kaeding, Alan Hudson, Jorge Nunez Ferrer, *Policy Coherence for Development in the EU Council: Strategies for the Way Forward*, (Brussels: Centre for European Policy Studies, 2006).

European Union (EU) – Ghana, *Joint Ghana-EU statement on migration*, (Accra: 14 June 2007).

EU – Sénégal, *Déclaration commune sur la gestion des Flux Migratoires*, (Dakar: 26-27 September 2007).

Gallina, Andrea, “Migration and Development Linkage in Italy: A De-centralised Cooperation Approach,” *Federico Caffè Centre Research Report*, No. 1 (Roskilde University, 2007).

Ghana News Agency (GNA), “EU to assist government combat illegal immigration,” (15 June 2007), <http://news.myjoyonline.com/news/200706/5729.asp> (last accessed 08/12/2008).

Gupta, Sanjeev, Catherine Pattillo, and Smita Wagh, “Impact of Remittances on Poverty and Financial Development in Sub-Saharan Africa,” *IMF Working Paper* No. 07/38 (Washington DC: IMF, 2007).

Higazi, Adam, “Integrating Migration and Development Policies: Challenges for ACP-EU Cooperation,” *Discussion Paper* 62 (Maastricht: ECPDM, January 2005).

Hudson, Alan, “Case Study on EU External Trade Policy: Economic Partnership Agreements,” in Egenhofer *et al.* (2006).

International Organisation for Migration (IOM), *Migration and Development Newsletter*, (The Hague: IOM, October 2007).

---, “Ghana,” IOM website (March 2008), <http://www.iom.int/jahia/Jahia/pid/393>, (last accessed 03/12/08).

IRIN, “Senegal: setting sights across the sea,” (31 October 2006), <http://www.irinnews.org/report.aspx?reportid=61453> (last accessed 13/11/08).

Katseli, Louka, Robert Lucas and Theodora Xenogiani, “Effects of Migration on Sending Countries: What Do We Know?,” *OECD Development Centre Working Paper* No. 250, (Paris: OECD, 2006).

Lindstrøm, Channe, “European Union Policy on Asylum and Immigration. Addressing the Root Causes of Forced Migration: A Justice and Home Affairs Policy of Freedom, Security and Justice?,” *Social Policy and Administration*, 39, 6, (December 2005).

Lavenex, Sandra “EU Trade Policy and Immigration Control,” in *Migration and the Externalities of European Integration*, S. Lavenex and E. Uçarer. eds., (Oxford: Lexington Books, 2002).

--- “Shifting Up and Out: The Foreign Policy of European Immigration Control,” in *Immigration Policy in Europe: the politics of control*, V. Guiraudon and G. Lahav, eds. (Oxon: Routledge, 2007).

Lavenex, Sandra and Rahel Kunz, “The Migration-Development Nexus in EU External Relations,” *European Integration*, 30, 3 (2008).

Gnisci, Donata, *West African Mobility and Migration Policies of OECD Countries*, West African Studies series, (Geneva: OECD Secretariat, 2008).

Markwei, Lawrence, “EU Gives Lifeline to Ghanaian Migrants,” *The Ghanaian Times*, (22 May 2008), <http://www.modernghana.com/newstthread2/166547/50/> (last accessed 21/11/2008).

Ndione, Babacar and Annelet Broekhuis, “International migration and development in Senegal, viewpoints and policy initiatives,” *Working paper on Migration and Development series*, Report No. 8, (Nijmegen: 2006).

Niessen, Jan, “International Migration on the EU Foreign Policy Agenda,” *European Journal of Migration and Law*, 1 (2000).

OECD, *International Migration Outlook 2008*, (Paris: OECD, 2008).

OECD Development Centre, *Policy Coherence for Development: Migration and Developing Countries*, (Paris: OECD, 2007).

Oucho, John, “African brain drain and gain, diaspora and remittances: More rhetoric than action,” in Adepoju *et al.* (2008).

Parliament of the European Union (EP), *Legislative resolution on the proposal for a directive of the European Parliament and of the Council on common standards and procedures in Member States for returning illegally staying third-country nationals*, P6_TA-PROV 0293, (Strasbourg: 18 June 2008).

Panizzon, Marion “Bilateral Migration Agreements and the GATS: Sharing responsibility versus MFN reciprocity,” *Society of International Economic Law Working Paper No. 44/08*, (July 2008).

---, “Labour Mobility as a Win-Win Model for Trade and Development in the Case of Senegal,” *NCCR Trade Regulation Working Paper No. 7*, (Berne: June 2008a)

Pastore, Ferruccio, “Europe, Migration and Development: Critical remarks on an emerging policy field,” (Rome: CeSPI, August 2007).

Quartey, Peter, “Migration and Development: Challenges and Opportunities for Sending Countries, Ghana Country Case Study,” *Report prepared for the German Marshall Fund of the USA*, (Washington: July 2006).

Roig, Annabelle and Thomas Huddleston, “EC Readmission Agreements: A Re-Evaluation of the Political Impasse,” *European Journal of Migration and Law* 9 (2007).

Smith, Karen, “The ACP in the European Union’s network of regional relationships: Still unique or just one in a crowd?” in *EU Development Cooperation: from model to symbol*, A. Dickson and K. Arts, eds. (New York: Manchester University Press, 2004).

Spaan, Ernst and David van Moppes, “African Exodus? Trends and Patterns of International Migration in Sub-Saharan Africa,” *Working papers Migration and Development series* Report No. 4, (Nijmegen: Radboud University, 2006).

Sterkx, Steven, “The External Dimension of EU Asylum and Migration Policy: Expanding Fortress Europe?,” in *Europe’s Global Role: External Policies of the European Union*, J. Orbie, ed., (Aldershot: Ashgate, 2008).

UNDP-Government of Ghana (GoG), *Country Programme Action Plan 2006-2010*, (Accra: 2006).

Van Criekinge, Tine, “The Integration of Migration Issues in the EPAs,” in *Beyond Market Access for Economic Development: EU-Africa Relations in Transition*, Jan Orbie and Gerrit Faber, eds, (London: Routledge, 2009).

Wabgou, Maguemati, “Governance of migration in Senegal: the role of government in formulating migration policies,” in *International migration and national development in sub-Saharan Africa*, A. Adepoju, T. van Naerssen, A. Zoomers, eds. (Leiden: Koninklijke Brill NV, 2008).

Winters, Alan, “GATS Mode 4: The Temporary Movement of Natural Persons,” Centre for Economic Policy Research, (2003).

Xenogiani, Theodora, “Migration Policy and its Interactions with Aid, Trade and Foreign Direct Investment Policies: A Background Paper,” *OECD Development Centre Working Paper* No. 249, (Paris: OECD, June 2006):

Zoomers, Annelies, Aderanti Adepoju, and Tom van Naerssen, “International migration and national development: An introduction to policies in sub-Saharan Africa,” in Adepoju *et al.* (2008).

Interviews

Interview 1: EC official, Brussels: 8 April 2008.

Interview 2: EC Delegation official, Accra: 24 October 2008.

Interview 3: EC Delegation official, Dakar: 2 June 2008.

Interview 4: IOM Official, Dakar: 5 June 2008.

Interview 5: IOM Official, Dakar: 5 June 2008.

Interview 6: IOM Official, Accra: 19 September 2008.

Interview 7: Senegalese government official, Dakar: 3 June 2008.

Interview 8: Ghanaian government official, Accra: 17 September 2008.

Interview 9: Ghanaian government official, Accra: 18 September 2008.