

**Integration Without Identification? The Determinants
of Europeanness in the EU**

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European Union Studies Association Conference
April 2009

In 2004, 56 percent of residents in Europe identified themselves, to some extent, as “European.” Of those surveyed, six percent considered themselves to feel European first, and second, their own nationality; four percent considered themselves exclusively European.¹ While at first glance the latter two numbers may not be staggeringly high, they represent a departure from the traditional identification to the nation-state. After the legal unification of Italy in 1860, Massimo D’Azeglio announced that, “having made Italy, we must now make Italians.”² This is not unlike the sentiment of the European elite today, which, having *made Europe*, must now focus on *making Europeans*. As Valéry Giscard d’Estaing noted, the transfer of competencies in the areas of social policy and taxation, among others, can only be achieved “if there is a meaningful feeling of identification between Europeans.”³ The founders of the EU were driven by the desire to foster a European identity “that would overarch and thereby temper contending nationalisms,”⁴ a European identity that would coexist with nationalism.

European identity has moved from a possible outcome of integration to a force determining the level of future integration, because without some identification with Europe on the part of the citizens, the political actors will not move forward.⁵ The founders, in their plans to foster Europeanism, were able to appeal to elites who would agree with collective decision-making at a supranational level. The transformation and

¹ Commission of the European Communities, Eurobarometer 61, 2004

² Quoted, Berezin, Mabel, “Territory, Emotion and Identity: Spatial Recalibration in a New Europe,” (Berezin and Schain) 15

³ Quoted, Mayer, Franz C. and Jan Palmowski, “European Identities and the EU - The Ties that Bind the Peoples of Europe,” (Journal of Common Market Studies, Volume 42, Number 3, September 2004) 574

⁴ Hooghe, Liesbet and Gary Marks, Multi-Level Governance and European Integration, (Lanham, MD: Rowman & Littlefield, 2001) 51

⁵ Hooghe and Marks 51

politicization of the EU over time has taken that “luxury” from officials and forced them to enhance the attachment of the mass public to the EU.⁶

Identification with Europe has significant implications. First, it fosters the legitimacy of European institutions as seen by the public, needed to combat the oft-cited democratic deficit. Legitimate political power is “acquired and exercised according to established rules, which are justifiable according to accepted beliefs,” including the “rightful source of authority, the proper ends and standards of government and recognition from other legitimate authorities.”⁷ Legitimacy is founded on the idea of popular sovereignty, which holds that the people represent ultimate authority, and as such, can be the only true source of power; it is not only about “establishing more democratic mechanisms or writing more EU law,” but also requires the public to “embrace a vision that typically is based on the myth of the imagined community.”⁸ National parliaments may become less legitimate as the EU takes control over “an increasing number of rights and interests that are coextensive with Europe and not simply the sum of each nation’s national interest.”⁹

Second, Europe’s identity is increasingly viewed as parallel to the continued development of the European Union, particularly because of its implications for national identity.¹⁰ Without support from constituents, national representatives are unlikely to forge ahead with political and social integration, and because the public holds officials accountable for their actions, a widespread European identification would enhance their ability to pursue integrationist policy. Support for such integration will require the

⁶ Hooghe and Marks 51

⁷ Beetham, David and Christopher Lord, “Legitimacy and the European Union,” (Weale and Nentwich) 15

⁸ Grant, Richard, “The political geography of European integration,” (Graham) 160

⁹ Cerutti, Furio, “Towards the Political Identity of the Europeans,” (Cerutti and Enno, Volume 1) 7

feeling of “Europeanness” throughout Europe. Legitimacy and integration are highly intertwined, and some say legitimacy is “by far the greatest obstacle to European integration today.”¹¹

To answer the question of why people feel European, it is first necessary to discuss various theories about identity and the formation thereof, followed by a more specific review of the European myth and the idea of Europe. The next section explains six hypotheses about European identity and the data and methodology of the study. Finally, the steps taken by the EU during the past fifty years are examined. In this paper, identifying with “Europe” is used to mean identifying with the European Union, though the varied meanings of the word are discussed below. Also, the phrases “identifying with Europe” and “feeling European” are used interchangeably throughout the paper.

Theories about Identity and a European Identity

Individual identity is often situational; for example, one might consider himself Viennese, Austrian or European, depending on the context. Collective identity is based upon a sense of distinctiveness from other groups in society and it requires the definition of an ‘in-group’ and an ‘out-group.’¹² The touted idea of “Europeanness” is a “collective identity that can transcend exclusively parochial and nationalistic loyalties and lay the foundations for a higher level of consciousness based on allegiance to European, rather

¹⁰ García, “Europe’s Fragmented Identities and the Frontiers of Citizenship,” (García) 2

¹¹ Shore, Cris. Building Europe: The Cultural Politics of European Integration. New York: Routledge, 2000 (19)

¹² Marcussen, Martin et.al. “Constructing Europe? The evolution of French, British and German nation state identities,” (Journal of European Public Policy. Volume 6, Number 4) 616

than national, institutions and ideals.”¹³ European identity, like most identities, is largely situational.

New political systems have for centuries been very aware of the necessity of generating a mass political identity to establish legitimacy. States that have failed to create this identity have “often experienced massive problems of a lack of civic cohesion and exclusion.”¹⁴ History is a key ingredient in the creation of an identity, because it helps form an individual’s conception of himself as a member of the community. Forming and promoting this history is a challenge for Europe and the European elites.

Since the founding of the European Coal and Steel Community, two theories of integration have served as explanatory agents. The first, intergovernmentalism, posits that the formation of European identity conflicts with existing national identities, yet never reaches the same status as national identity because it is without the rooted symbols and myths. In contrast, neofunctionalism argues that loyalties will gradually be transferred to the European level. This theory is based upon the assumption that national identities are not as deeply rooted as intergovernmentalists argue.¹⁵

Theories of multiple identities have two main models: the ‘nested’ model and the ‘marble cake’ model. The first implies a series of concentric circles, or nesting dolls, with one identity inside the next.¹⁶ In this instance, local identities would be inside regional, inside national, inside supranational. The second suggests the many

¹³ Shore 21

¹⁴ Bruter, Michael, “Winning hearts and minds for Europe: news, symbols, and civic and cultural European identity,” (Comparative Political Studies, Volume 36, Number 10, December 2003) 1148-1149

¹⁵ Kostakopoulou, Theodora, Citizenship, identity and immigration in the European Union, (New York: Manchester University Press, 2001) 23

¹⁶ Risse, Thomas, “Neofunctionalism, European identity, and the puzzles of European integration,” (Journal of European Public Policy, Volume 12, Number 2, April 2005. P.291-309) 295-296

components of individual identity are mixed together and are interdependent.¹⁷ As such, the same identity, be it ‘German’ or ‘Welsh,’ can mean very different things to everyone who holds it, based on the way his identities play off one another. Such is the case with Europeaness.

Some scholars argue that there are distinct European characteristics upon which a common identity can be built, while others argue that no such basis exists. Elements present in nation-building – common language, educational systems, a society with citizenship rights – are either in the midst of being created or will be impossible to create.¹⁸ Furthermore, characteristics crucial to building national identity are often the ones dividing Europeans, rather than bringing them together.

Civic identity involves a “group of individuals rationally united within shared structures of citizenship,” much like the aspects of the European citizenship enshrined in the Treaty on European Union – with certain restrictions, any citizen of the Union can live and work within the confines of the EU and stand as a candidate and vote in local and European Parliament elections.¹⁹ The steps toward a European citizenship take root in the free movement of persons throughout the member states of the EU. Because of this, Mayer and Palmowski call European citizenship the “*sine qua non* for a meaningful European identity,” and say it has “severely limited... the exclusivity of nationality.”²⁰ Hooghe and Marks caution that the influence of EU institutions on European identity

¹⁷ Risse “Neofunctionalism, European identity, and the puzzles of European integration,” 296

¹⁸ Garcia, “Europe’s Fragmented Identities and the Frontiers of Citizenship,” 2

¹⁹ Hansen and Williams 236

²⁰ Mayer and Palmowski 592

could depend on how meaningful the shared European citizenship is to the individuals in question.²¹

The European version of cultural identity would be in reference to the European continent or a European civilization. The EU is representative of the European civic identity.²² Increasing the feeling of Europeanness requires fostering the “perception of the salience of Europe as an area of civic unity,” as focus group studies have regularly shown a majority articulating a predominantly civic view of Europe.²³ Essentially, most Europeans think “Europe” means “the European Union,” rather than making the leap between “Europe” and “a European *demos*.”

Factors Affecting Identity

Hypothesis 1: People in countries that have been members of the EU for longer periods of time will feel more European.

Countries, at the time they joined the Union, had publics which were supportive of – or at least, permissive toward – integration. This support allowed elites in these countries to push forward with the process.²⁴ In a study about support for integration, Anderson and Kaltenthaler found that regardless of the timing of a country’s entry into the European Union, support increased over time.²⁵ Their theory was twofold: elites educate the public about membership benefits and the public becomes increasingly

²¹ Hooghe and Marks 65

²² Bruter, “On what citizens mean by feeling ‘European’: perceptions of news, symbols and borderlessness,” 35

²³ Bruter, “On what citizens mean by feeling ‘European’: perceptions of news, symbols and borderlessness,” 35-36

²⁴ Anderson, Christopher J. and Karl C. Kaltenthaler, “The Dynamics of Public Opinion toward European Integration, 1973-93,” (European Journal of International Relations, Volume 2, Number 2, June 1996) 177

²⁵ Anderson and Kaltenthaler 190

familiar with the institutions and rules of the EU.²⁶ Stemming both from these findings and the hypothesized correlation between support and identification, it is likely that the longer a country has been a member of the European Union, the greater the level of identification with Europe its citizens will feel.

Hypothesis 2: People from countries with federal systems of government will feel more European.

Identification and attachment in federal systems are often divided among the national and regional levels, with regional attachment being relatively high.²⁷ These states are “used to sharing sovereignty among the various levels of territorial governance,” and as a result, their publics may more readily form an identity with a supranational layer of governance.²⁸ While, in countries like Spain and the United Kingdom devolution has occurred to varying extents, it differs from a formal federal system because these partially autonomous regions do not have the same ability to be represented at the European level. To operate at the European level is to symbolically appear as more than a region at home, which, “above all, explains the strong pro-Europeanism of most minority nationalists in the European Union.”²⁹ Identification with Europe will likely be higher in these devolved regions, but depending on the size of the region compared to the rest of the country, it may not be enough to have an effect on the overall level of identification.

²⁶ Anderson and Kaltenthaler 183-184

²⁷ Hooghe and Marks 64

²⁸ Risse, “Neofunctionalism, European identity, and the puzzles of European integration,” 300

²⁹ Keating, Michael, “Nations without states: Minority nationalism in the global era,” (Requejo) 50-51

Hypothesis 3: People from countries with more open citizenship policies will feel more European.

Citizenship is the final stage in a successful immigration policy. However, while economic factors primarily drive immigration policies, naturalization policies are almost entirely political. They require the “integration of strangers and the acceptance of different cultures and races,” as each state thereby “gives its stamp of inclusion to each person accepted into the nation-state’s inner circle of citizens.”³⁰ The combination of emigration, declining birth rates and rising immigration numbers in Europe present a crisis of identity for many Europeans. Nationalism may rise and a large portion of the citizenry may view “immigrants as the final insult to national identity.”³¹ As public opinion drives the policies of the leaders, it is probable that individuals in countries more readily accepting non-nationals into their ranks will feel less exclusively national, and more European.

Hypothesis 4: People from countries with higher levels of per capita GDP will feel more European.

Though it was assumed wealthier individuals would identify more strongly with their nation, recent studies have disproved this theory. Shulman proposes that national identity “can serve as an equalizer in the face of clear disparities between economic achievement and status,” thus making the common myths shared by citizens of the same

³⁰ Janoski, Thomas and Elizabeth Glennie, “The Integration of Immigrants in Advanced Industrialized Nations,” (Martiniello) 11

³¹ Janoski and Glennie 21

nation more relevant than their socio-economic status.³² As a result, the economic status of a nation as a whole is more important when looking at identification than is the wealth of the individuals therein.

Today's business leaders concur that the lack of 'fellow feeling' in Europe is negatively affecting the single market and the competitiveness of Europe on a world stage for goods and services. Leading economies are able to stay strong in part because they create national demand for national products; the United States and Japan are good examples of this.³³ Scholars largely agree that economic success and memories of such success can foster development of national identity.³⁴ With the introduction and success of the Euro, similar reasoning suggests that individuals across Europe may feel a common bond over their economies. However, citizens in countries outside the Euro-zone are not excluded from the GDP-European identity link, as the spread of global economies can undermine the nation-state by making one's prosperity increasingly more reliant upon transnational factors.³⁵

Hypothesis 5: People from countries with higher unemployment levels will feel more European.

In addition to the above-mentioned international economic interdependency, the nations of Europe have been threatened by sluggish growth, large deficits and high unemployment since the late 1980s.³⁶ As a result, scholars theorize that citizens have

³² Shulman, Stephen, "Exploring the economic basis of nationhood," (Nationalism and Ethnic Politics, Volume 9, Number 2, June 2003) 46

³³ Shore 20-21

³⁴ Shulman 26

³⁵ Shulman 47

³⁶ Shulman 26

begun to look to Europe and the EU to provide them with greater wealth and job opportunities. Additionally, some claim that the regions with the highest unemployment rates often benefit from the largest amounts of regional aid, which is directly associated with the EU as an institution, possibly increasing their support for and identification with Europe.³⁷

Hypothesis 6: People from countries with less support for extremist, anti-immigration parties will feel more European.

Continuing from the idea of citizenship and openness toward immigrants, the increasing influx over the past decades has created a “reactive, xenophobic kind of nationalism,” through which these culturally different individuals are perceived by the “indigenous population as a potential or an actual threat to national identity.”³⁸ The extreme right parties are considered highly nationalistic. Their post-war focus has been protecting the nation from outsiders, and they play on fears of a loss of tradition and of being challenged for limited employment opportunities. Since the 1980s, extremist parties have broken through in many legislative elections throughout Western Europe, and in some cases, joined governing coalitions. Linked to Hypothesis 4, it is likely that in countries where extremist, anti-immigration parties receive fewer votes, the public will feel more European.

³⁷ Mahler, Vincent A., Bruce J. Taylor and Jennifer R. Wozniak, “Economics and Public Support for the European Union: An Analysis at the National, Regional, and Individual Levels,” (*Polity*, Volume 32, Number 3, Spring 2000) 442

³⁸ Llobera, Josep R, “The Role of the State and the Nation in Europe,” (García) 72

Data and Methodology

The dependent variables come from the annual Eurobarometer studies carried out by the European Commission. The data set includes information for the fifteen Western European member states for the years 1992-2003. There are five dependent variables: the percentage of citizens surveyed who identify only with their nationality, first with their nationality and secondly with Europe, first with Europe and secondly with their nationality, only with Europe, and with both their nationality and Europe, in either order.

The citizenship variable was created by dividing national citizenship laws into six categories, which were further subdivided to obtain the index (see Appendix A.) Once the data was compiled, using the elements above, each country-year was marked as having or not having a specific citizenship policy component (i.e. recognition of dual citizenship). Every component contributing to a more open policy added to the ranking of that country-year. The scale runs from zero to eighty-five, with zero being the most exclusionary citizenship law, and eighty-five being the most liberal or open citizenship law.

Results and Analysis

Length of EU membership was significant in the direction hypothesized, suggesting a socialization effect. The federal structure of a country had a mostly significant effect, with federal systems having citizens that felt more national and non-federal systems correlated with feeling European to some degree. This is contrary to Hypothesis 2. One possible explanation for the negative effect is that attachments are often “highest among contiguous territorial units,” meaning that the “strongest

associations for any territorial level are those with the next level up or down,” such as from local to regional, regional to national, national to European, or the reverse.³⁹

The citizenship score of a country had a somewhat significant effect on European identity, with the significant regressions suggesting a negative correlation between it and feeling European; countries with more open citizenship policies were less likely to feel European, contrary to the hypothesis. This could be a result of citizens feeling their country being “invaded” by outsiders and, to protect their sense of identity, they increase their nationalist sentiments and hold more exclusively national identification.

Table 1: Effects of national issues on identity (EU 15)

Independent Variable	National	Both N & E	European
Years of Membership	-0.513*** (0.056)	0.404*** (0.046)	0.091*** (0.017)
Federal System	5.360** (1.833)	-6.054*** (1.523)	-0.484 (0.555)
Citizenship score	0.131* (0.055)	-0.171*** (0.046)	0.006 (0.017)
GDP per capita	-0.0003** (0.0001)	0.0001*** (0.0000)	0.0002*** (0.0001)
Unemployment rate	-0.881*** (0.233)	0.615** (0.193)	0.164* (0.070)
Right-wing Votes	-0.267** (0.080)	0.334*** (0.193)	-0.027 (0.024)
Constant	65.377*** (3.908)	38.48*** (3.248)	-3.964** (1.183)
F-test	F(6, 164) = 23.81 Pr. = 0.000	F(6,164) = 21.67 Pr. = 0.000	F(6,164) = 19.33 Pr. = 0.000

*** significant at <.001% level, ** .001 level, * .05 level

³⁹ Hooghe and Marks 56

Per-capita GDP had a significant effect, with higher-GDP countries feeling more European, supporting Hypothesis 4. The increasingly international economic structure can lessen national identification, as an individual's prosperity becomes dependent upon international actors.⁴⁰ Similarly, higher unemployment rates had a significant positive correlation to feeling more European and less exclusively national, supporting Hypothesis 5. The right-wing extremism variable was mostly significant, but lower levels of votes for such parties were correlated with greater feelings of nationalism, and vice-versa, contrary to Hypothesis 6. A reason for this could be that though extremist right-wing parties received support in almost all countries, only in cases like the 2000 Austrian elections did politicians from these parties form part of a coalition government.

Trends across Europe

There is a clear divide between north and south in Europe in terms of how they perceive Europe and their ties to it, according to studies conducted by the European Commission. The large south – states geographically in the south, center or east of the continent – sees Europe historically and as a place of culture that has produced diverse people with common roots. This culture is particularly enticing for the Latin countries, Belgium and Luxembourg.⁴¹ These states, over time, have belonged to empires, like the Habsburg, Byzantine and Holy Roman, in which they mixed with dissimilar people. The northern countries – Scandinavia, the British Isles, and Germany – do not feel the same

⁴⁰ Shulman 47

⁴¹ Commission of the European Communities, "Perceptions of the European Union," (June 2001) 5

pull or desire to be part of a European culture. The study shows that over the past two decades, this split between north and south has widened.⁴²

The citizens of small states may be more aware of their government's somewhat limited ability to ensure protection, strong economic performance and a welfare system. To this end, they are thought to be more likely to both identify with the EU that can supplement these roles and, following from this, accept the legitimacy of the EU.⁴³ Additionally, small states gain a protection from larger states in decision-making, because they are given a proportionately larger share of voting rights. While all of this may explain high levels of identification with Europe in the Benelux countries and Ireland, the Scandinavian countries, with their small populations, are examples of small states with a prevailing skeptical attitude toward Europe, possibly because of their "intimacy as political arenas."⁴⁴ A citizenry's perception of their country as a core or periphery member state is also likely to affect how greatly it identifies with Europe. The variables of being core or periphery are geographic, in terms of distance from Brussels, as well as their history and length of membership, by which account the Benelux countries and Ireland are more central and the Nordic countries more peripheral.

A European identity may be stronger in member states with greater internal divisions, be they in minority communities or as a result of "imperfect state formation," where the state "has not succeeded in capturing all sentiments of political loyalty for the nation."⁴⁵ For example, Belgium is one of the most internally divided countries, with the Flanders and Walloon communities each taking about half the population, and has one

⁴² Commission of the European Communities, "Perceptions of the European Union," 6

⁴³ Beetham and Lord 23

⁴⁴ Beetham and Lord 23

⁴⁵ Beetham and Lord 23-24

of the highest identification levels. Feelings of Europeanness are also typically higher in those regions and communities than the national average.

In times when a state is perceived to have failed to protect its citizens, identification with Europe may increase. The largest example of this is in times of war; there is a strong correlation between conflict and support for integration in the twentieth century.⁴⁶ Hooghe and Marks say that “organized coercion – above all, war and colonial domination” has done more to shape attachments to territory than anything else.⁴⁷ In wartime situations, a strong “us” versus “them” national mentality takes hold and triumphs supra- and sub-national identities. In times of peace, this “immensely powerful influence toward exclusive identity” is absent, allowing for greater multiple identities; in this case, European identity.⁴⁸

The EU and Steps Toward Common Identity

Romano Prodi recently said that an identity for Europe is necessary, as the goal of the elite is to build a “true political Union.”⁴⁹ European officials have long struggled with a solution for turning ordinary peoples of Europe into Europeans. The problem, in their minds, is that “action is needed in the cultural sector to make people more aware of their European identity” and that it is necessary to “[stimulate] public interest in the European venture” to obtain the “direct involvement of the people in their own

⁴⁶ Beetham and Lord 24

⁴⁷ Hooghe and Marks 60

⁴⁸ Hooghe and Marks 61

⁴⁹ Prodi, Romano, Enlargement of the Union and European Identity, (Florence: European University Institute, 2003) 3

destiny.”⁵⁰ The founding fathers wanted to create myths to replace the old ones, a point which has created some of the angriest debates within the EU. This process of “internal colonialism” would not be met without resistance.⁵¹ The 1964 fight between Walter Hallstein and Charles de Gaulle over the Commission’s receiving of ambassadors is one good example. De Gaulle was determined “to prevent the EEC developing the symbols of statehood,” while Hallstein’s intentions were to promote this development.⁵²

During the time of the ECSC and EEC, the projects were technocratic and elite-driven. The public had little interest in this idea of Europe and did not truly question the legitimacy of the decisions made, hence the existence of what is called a “permissive consensus.” Many elites feel that a technocratic European Union is not a problem; just as, for example, bureaucrats transformed “peasants into Frenchmen” under Napoleon, the European bureaucrats hope to transform ‘peasants’ into ‘Europeans,’ a process they believe starts among themselves.⁵³

After the signing of the Treaty of Rome, Walter Hallstein said, “we are not integrating economies, we are integrating politics. We are not just sharing our furniture, we are buying a new and bigger house.”⁵⁴ The obstacles to freedom of movement of people were removed from that point until the early 1970s, with, as one example, family members of workers gaining entry and residence rights.

The Paris Summit of October 1972 introduced an “ambitious program to establish a political union,” and the following year’s Copenhagen Summit produced a “Declaration

⁵⁰ Commission of the European Communities, “A People’s Europe: Communication from the Commission to the European Parliament,” (Bulletin of the European Communities, Supplement 2, Luxembourg: Office for Official Publications of the European Communities, 7 July 1988) Quoted Shore 25

⁵¹ Hechter, Michael, Internal Colonialism: The Celtic Fringe in British National Development, (London: Routledge, 1975) Quoted Shore 27

⁵² Wallace, William, The Transformation of Western Europe 30

⁵³ Shore 33-34

on European Identity,” which set out for the first time, “principles for the internal development of the Community, thereby furnishing a framework for the formation of a political conception of European identity.”⁵⁵ However, this conception involved much Euro-rhetoric and did little to formally define “European identity.” In December 1974, policy objectives for identity gave the 1973 Declaration more substance. Members of the EP were to be directly and universally elected and special rights would be bestowed upon citizens of the member states. The Belgian Prime Minister, Leo Tindemans, was asked to draft a report detailing the measures required for the “creation of a Europe of citizens,” though the Hague Summit reviewed the Tindemans report without any positive decisions.⁵⁶

The passport union was created around this time, under which citizens of member states would carry uniform passports and rules about border control and alien rights were harmonized. This was one of the many symbolic measures undertaken in an effort to inspire the public to feel more European; the idea was that holding identical passports would create a common bond, though most people did not feel more like a member of a European community.⁵⁷ Typically, by using symbols like currency, anthems, ceremonies and flags, members of a group are “reminded of their common heritage and cultural kinship and feel strengthened and exalted by their sense of common identity and belonging.”⁵⁸

The mandate of the second report of the Adonnino Committee, established by the Fontainebleau Council in 1985, was to “propose measures which would tend to reinforce

⁵⁴ Quoted Kostakopoulou 40

⁵⁵ Kostakopoulou 44-45

⁵⁶ Kostakopoulou 45-46

⁵⁷ Kostakopoulou 46-47

the identity and image of the community in such a way as to make these conform more closely to citizens' expectations."⁵⁹ This report included propositions for identity-building and symbol-creation: a "comprehensive European inter-university program of exchanges" and asking member states to recognize of academic credentials of other states; the use of the circle of twelve gold stars on a blue background as both a Community emblem and flag; the playing of Beethoven's "Ode to Joy" from the Ninth Symphony at European events; the issuing of postage stamps to commemorate important European Community events; and the redesigning of signs at borders to reflect the openness of the single market.⁶⁰

The adoption of the Schengen Agreements in 1985 by France, Germany, and the Benelux countries established a framework for the gradual removal of internal border restrictions between signatory countries. It would, ten years later, be enshrined of the Treaty of Amsterdam. The Single European Act of 1986 marked a turning point at which the European bodies, "while remaining unaccountable to a European popular assembly, began producing a growing number of regulations, and the issue of legitimacy was raised."⁶¹ The Treaty on European Union showed a "realization that identification couldn't be ordained, but had to be achieved through political and economic reforms and by fostering a new universalist ethos which would help transform the active economic actors' rights into citizens' rights."⁶² Title IX, Article 128, of the Maastricht Treaty says "the Community shall contribute to the flowering of the cultures of the Member States

⁵⁸ Smith, Anthony, National Identity, (New York: Penguin Books, 1991) 16-17

⁵⁹ Odermatt, Peter, "The use of symbols in the drive for European integration," (Leerssen and Spiering) 225

⁶⁰ Commission of the European Communities, A People's Europe: Reports from the ad hoc Committee, (Luxembourg: Office for Official Publications of the European Communities, 1985) 23-28

⁶¹ Castano, Emanuele, "European Identity: A Social-Psychological Perspective," (Herrmann, Risse and Brewer) 41

⁶² Kostakopoulou 54

while respecting their national and regional diversity and at the same time bringing the common cultural heritage to the fore.”⁶³ The EU celebrates national diversity in a framework that emphasizes this diversity’s importance to Europe; for example, “the city of Venice, the paintings of Rembrandt, the music of Beethoven or the plays of Shakespeare are an integral part of a common cultural heritage and are regarded as common property by the citizens of Europe.”⁶⁴ The problem surrounding the ratification of the Treaty on European Union was the first true conflict between nationalism and European identity.

Symbols are how ideas like ‘nation,’ ‘citizenship’ and ‘Europe’ become tangible and understandable. They are more than “window dressing;” they actively create political reality.⁶⁵ These invented traditions try to “inculcate certain values and norms of behavior by implying continuity with the past,” now that European elites realize that a supranational identity will not occur on its own as a byproduct of integration.⁶⁶ Though many treaties reference this European identity, none formally define it. A definition is a difficult task, as a too-narrow definition “risks excluding foreign goods, immigrants and entire countries,” while a too-wide definition “may dilute the very values that the European identity was intended to protect and project in the first place.”⁶⁷

Conclusion

The importance of having a European identity, whatever it may be, is apparent. The effects of identity are far-reaching, and can affect already-integrated sectors of

⁶³ European Communities, “Treaty on European Union,” (Official Journal C 191, Online, 12 January 2005)

⁶⁴ Shore 53

⁶⁵ Shore 36

⁶⁶ Hobsbawm, Eric, “Introduction: Inventing Traditions,” (Hobsbawm and Ranger) 1

Europe. Making the public more connected to Europe and to the EU is all but impossible without a “European people,” which differs greatly from “citizens in Europe”. The “constitutional process and the constitutional rhetoric inherent in the work of the Convention have been closely related to an attempt to express a European identity,” as constitutions are “also expressions of the moral and political identity of the *demos* they seek to define.”⁶⁸ This lack of *demos*, according to some, is the reason for the cited lack of democracy in the EU, for “the democratic system without ‘*demos*’ is just ‘*cratos*,’ or power.”⁶⁹ A *demos* certainly does not need to be an *ethnos*, but unless the members of the *demos* recognize each other as such, a common identity can not form. Bruter asks if it is “fair to create a European ‘citizenship’ and a fully institutionalized European political system if citizens do not ‘feel’ European yet,” and certainly, there are many who would say it is unfair to do so.⁷⁰

Prodi said that, “European identity is inextricably linked to a new type of citizenship based on multiple forms of allegiance, ranging from the local town to the Union. The single national identity would be replaced by complementary identities.”⁷¹ However, because “nobody can become European without first acquiring a national identity... the new form of European citizenship and identity does not really transcend national identities, it is currently completely dependent on national identity.”⁷² As a result, it is possible that the groups excluded from European national citizenships, either

⁶⁷ Cederman, Lars-Erik, “Political Boundaries and Identity Trade-Offs,” (Cederman) 3

⁶⁸ Mayer and Palmowski 583; see also Weiler, “A Constitution for Europe? Some Hard Choices”

⁶⁹ Herrero de Miñón, Miguel, “Europe’s Non-existent Body Politic,” (Miguel Herrero de Miñón and Graham Leicester, Europe: A Time for Pragmatism, London: European Policy Forum, 1996, 1-5) Quoted Shore 20

⁷⁰ Bruter, “On what citizens mean by feeling ‘European’: perceptions of news, symbols and borderlessness,” 22

⁷¹ Prodi 3

voluntarily or involuntarily, will turn to Europe for support and identify more strongly with Europe. This is seen already to an extent with the minority groups. It is possible that a European identity will arise and overcome these obstacles, but it is also possible – and perhaps, likely – that the construction of a European identity will remain reliant upon, and largely secondary to, national identity. From the founding fathers through today’s leaders, the idea of an overarching European identity has remained ever-present.

European countries are increasingly defined as members of the EU, non-members of the EU, or aspiring members of the EU; this affects their position within Europe, and to some extent, internationally, as the EU becomes impossible to ignore or overlook. Using ‘Europe’ and ‘the EU’ interchangeably, as many in Europe already do, that means the EU has “successfully occupied the social space of what it means to be European. One could then not be a ‘real’ European without being an EU member.”⁷³ The uncertain identity of Europe is reflected in the discussions over the countries that should or should not be part of Europe. No one would argue that Switzerland and Norway are not part of Europe, yet both of their publics have refused membership when asked. On the other hand, countries like Turkey are passionately committed to joining the EU, though their cultural and geographical ties to Europe are questionable.⁷⁴ Even the 2004 Eastern enlargement has not rectified the fact that the borders of the EU do not line up with the “borders of a European culture and civilization.”⁷⁵

⁷² Jacobs, Dirk and Robert Maier, “European Identity: Construct, Fact and Fiction,” (Gastelaars and Ruijter) 31

⁷³ Risse, “European Institutions and Identity Change: What Have We Learned?” 255

⁷⁴ Decker, Frank, “Governance beyond the nation-state: Reflections on the democratic deficit of the European Union,” (*Journal of European Public Policy*, Volume 9, Number 2, April 2002) 264

⁷⁵ Bruter, *Citizens of Europe? The Emergence of a Mass European Identity* 7

There are two methods by which some form of supranational European identity may form, without any suppression of diversity or invention of new myths. The first is by the promotion of trans-European political parties, which would in turn promote policy at the European level and relay developments directly to constituents, cutting out the national-level ‘middleman.’ The situation today is that parties in the European Parliament act “predominantly or almost exclusively” as “actors of their respective national party systems.”⁷⁶ These parties should be the most important political advocates of integration, but they have little legitimacy or power of their own. If political parties would shift parts of their loyalty to the European level, integration could become more appealing to the citizens and increase European identification.⁷⁷

The second method is by creating a trans-European broadcast media. The broadcast media, by virtue of mode of operation, provide the public with symbolic messages, rather than expanding and expanding on information. Studies have shown that mass media exposure can influence the political party identification of individuals, which “makes it possible to claim that not only behavior but also attitudes are influenced by media messages, and suggest that perhaps, deeper identities may be influenced by political communication as well.”⁷⁸ While this may be, in theory, an excellent way to disseminate and promote a European identity, it will, in practice, not work for several reasons. First, there is no assurance that the public will interpret the media messages in the intended manner. Second, the media are centered around regions and nations; genuine trans-European media do not yet exist.⁷⁹ Third, as most actors in European news

⁷⁶ Papcke, Sven, “Who Needs European Identity and What Could it Be?” (Nelson, Roberts and Veit) 82

⁷⁷ Papcke 85-92

⁷⁸ Bruter, Citizens of Europe? The Emergence of a Mass European Identity 28-29

⁷⁹ Bakir, Vian, ‘An identity for Europe? The role of the media,’ (Wintle) 183-192

represent the country in which the news is broadcast, the stories are presented with a national slant. However, citizens in Europe continue to identify television news as their most important way of learning about European issues.⁸⁰

The creation of a common European myth is complex and will remain so. Both top-down and bottom-up initiatives are necessary to construct a European identity. It is clear that neofunctionalist theory has its limits, and that spillover into cultural arenas does not happen as readily as originally thought. Despite the potential difficulties, European policymakers must push forward to foster the feeling of Europeanness so that integration into new sectors is possible. Based on the research above, it appears that much of the push needs to occur at the national level, as the factors outside of the EU's control have been shown to be, on the whole, more significant than those which the EU does control. If European elites understand which variables have the most significant effect on identification with Europe, they can use the information to better foster the European idea and identity, though it may be civic rather than cultural in nature. European identification may remain an elite affair, as they are often in better positions to take advantage of the opportunities presented by integration, opportunities seen as a threat to some of the public.⁸¹ The problem remains that elite identification without mass identification is not enough to push the European ideal through the twenty-first century.

⁸⁰ De Vreese, Claes H, Framing Europe: Television News and European Integration, (Amsterdam: Aksant, 2003) 161-165

⁸¹ Herrmann, Richard and Marilyn B. Brewer, "Identities and Institutions: Becoming European in the EU," (Herrmann, Risse and Brewer) 15

Appendix A: Citizenship Index Criteria

1. Is citizenship conferred based on birth – *jus solis* – in X?
 - a. If yes, is it automatically conferred?
 - b. If no, can citizenship be obtained by a person born in X upon reaching adulthood, after having lived in X continuously?
 - c. If no, can citizenship be obtained by a person born in X if one parent has been a resident for a specific period of time?
 - d. If no, is there an exception for children of unknown or stateless parents?
2. Is citizenship conferred based on descent – *jus sanguinis* – in X?
 - a. If yes, do out-of-wedlock children take the citizenship of the father? (i.e. a mother from X but a father from Y, child is not a citizen of X until the parents marry)
 - b. If yes, can citizenship of a child born in-wedlock be conferred by either parent?
 - c. If yes, must the child be born within the boundaries of X for automatic conferral? (versus requiring registration of the child as a citizen)
 - d. If yes, can citizenship be conferred through relatives other than a mother or father?
 - e. If yes, is there a provision for adopted children of a citizen of X to receive the citizenship of X as well?
3. Is there a specific legal provision for acquiring citizenship through marriage?
 - a. If yes, is there a residency requirement prior to receiving citizenship?
 - b. If yes, is there a length of marriage requirement prior to application?
 - c. If yes, is there a provision for children of foreign citizens who marry citizens of X to acquire citizenship of X as well?
4. Can citizenship be acquired through naturalization?
 - a. If yes, is the residency requirement five years or fewer?
 - b. If yes, is the residency requirement more than five but fewer than ten years?
 - c. If yes, is the residency requirement ten years or more?
 - d. If yes, are there additional requirements, such as knowledge of the official language(s) or other assimilation into X?
 - e. If yes, is preferential treatment given to residents of a specific outside region in terms of a shortened residency requirement?
5. Are there other possibilities for acquisition of citizenship for people not falling into one of the above categories?
 - a. If yes, can children of legal immigrants or permanent residents acquire citizenship?
 - b. If yes, can a non-citizen who performs a service, military or otherwise, for X acquire citizenship?
 - c. If yes, can relatives of a citizen of X other than spouses or children acquire citizenship?
6. Is dual citizenship recognized?

- a. If no, are there exceptions for children of a citizen of X born abroad, thus acquiring citizenship of Y, also acquiring citizenship of X based on *jus sanguinis*?
- b. If no, and such exceptions exist, must the child abandon dual-citizen status upon reaching adulthood by renouncing either citizenship of X or Y?