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**Bulwark, Trojan Horse or What? Citizen's Attitudes Towards the
EU's Role in the Process of Globalisation**

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"Certes, dans le contexte de la mondialisation,
l'Union européenne donne trop souvent le
sentiment d'être le cheval de Troie de l'étranger
au moment même où jamais nos concitoyens
n'ont ressenti un tel besoin de préserver leur
identité nationale."
Nicolas Sarkozy (Speech in Brussels, 8
September 2006)

1. Introduction

The current wave of globalisation until 2008 was characterized by unprecedented worldwide flows of goods, capital, people, information, and ideas. So is European integration on a regional geographic scale. In the growing body of literature on the relationship between globalisation and European integration, the latter is often portrayed as accelerating the forces of globalisation through deep market integration inside Europe. Some authors conceive of European integration as being simply a "regional variant of globalisation" (Schmidt 2003). According to other scholars, deep market integration inside the EU is promoting – alongside globalisation – a trend towards rising social inequalities in the EU member states (Beckfield 2006) and/or to a relocation of European companies and to tendencies of welfare state retrenchment. The European Union would thus not be capable of mitigating the negative economic and social effects of globalisation on the European social model(s). Even though there is empirical evidence that the pressures of economic globalisation do not lead to a uniform reduction of social welfare programmes and provisions (cf. Begg, Draxler, Mortensen 2008 for key trends), the mass publics in EU member states might nevertheless see the EU as part of the problem rather than part of the solution. The multi-faceted phenomenon of globalisation is open for many interpretations by citizens as well as by political elites, and so is the relationship between globalisation and European integration (cf. Hay/Rosamond 2002).

EU-level political actors on the other hand, especially the Commission, are portraying the EU as an actor helping citizens to reap the benefits of the process of globalisation and shielding them from its negative side effects. A discourse on the EU being a bulwark against negative economic, social and/or cultural impacts of globalisation on the societies of its member states can also be found in the programmes and statements of many mainstream political parties from the centre right and especially from the centre left of the political spectrum.

But how convincing is this discourse? Who – i.e. which segments of the population – attributes the EU a positive role in providing opportunities for citizens to benefit from globalisation and protecting them from its dark sides? And how are these perceptions of the EU's role related to perceptions of and attitudes towards the process of globalisation itself in the mass publics of the EU's member states?

While there is a growing body of survey-based literature on citizens' attitudes towards European integration (e.g. Niedermayer/Sinnot 1998; Brettschneider/Van Deth/Roller 2003; Marks/Steenbergen 2004; Fuchs/Magni-Berton/Roger 2009), survey-based research on attitudes towards globalisation and trade in Western mass publics (or EU member states) is less developed (e.g. Norris 2000; Scheve and Slaughter 2001; O'Rourke 2003; Mayda/Rorik 2005; Wolfe and Mendelsohn 2005; Margalit 2006;2007). And survey-based research on the relationship between attitudes towards globalisation and attitudes towards the EU and the EU's role with respect to the process of globalisation is, to our knowledge, virtually non-existent (cf. Gerhards/Hessel 2008 for one of the rare studies which link both fields of research).

Taking a cleavage theoretical approach as our starting point and based on recent Eurobarometer survey data, this paper intends to take a closer look at citizens' perceptions of globalisation and the EU's role therein. Our main questions are the following: (1) How do citizens of the EU's member states perceive the EU's role in the process of globalisation and how much do these perceptions differ between the member states? (2) Why do some citizens see the EU as an effective shield against the negative effects of globalisation whereas others do not? And to what extent are individual-level variables on the one hand and national context variables on the other hand responsible for the empirical pattern of attitudes?

2. The EU's globalisation script: How convincing is it?¹

The relationship between citizens' attitudes towards globalisation and towards European integration might be of critical importance for the legitimacy resources of the EU. If important or even growing segments of the EU member states' populations were to display serious reservations with respect to the impact of globalisation on their countries and their individual life chances, then it is politically highly relevant to know to what extent these critical attitudes might erode their support for the European level of policy-making. This is all the more so in times of a global economic crisis where millions of EU citizens feel deeply hurt by the economic and social fallout of the first truly global recession during the current wave of globalisation.

Examining the European Commission's view on European economic integration and globalisation, it becomes quickly clear that both processes are seen as being directly connected and sharing the same underlying rationale. The EU was created as an economic community the primary goal of which was the creation of a common market. Nevertheless the latter is not the ultimate goal but rather a means to another aim, namely the increase of the economic welfare of its citizens. The EU thus links the promotion of

¹ The following paragraphs draw on Gerhards/Hessel 2008.

competition and liberalisation of trade with the intention to enhance economic growth and prosperity. The European Commission assigns the same purpose to the process of globalisation: „European economic openness is vital for creating jobs and growth in Europe and for our international competitiveness. Openness to global trade and investment increases our ability to exploit the benefits of an effective single market. It exposes the domestic economy to creative competitive pressures, spurring and rewarding innovation, providing access to new technologies and increasing incentives for investment“ (Commission of the European Communities 2006). According to the Commission’s communication „Global Europe: Competing in the World“, Europe should therefore reject any form of protectionism since this would damage the economy (Commission of the European Communities 2006). But in the view of the Commission, the opening of the European market to global trade not only brings advantages for companies but also for the citizens in terms of growth, jobs and cheaper products. The EU therefore sees itself as helping the citizens to better benefit from the effects of globalisation by “[...] reduced prices and increased choice” and also by “[...] ensuring that imports meet necessary standards” (Commission of the European Communities 2007).

However, following particular criticism after the liberalisation of trade in textiles at the end of 2005, the Commission also began to acknowledge that there are negative effects of trade opening which can be felt in several sectors or regions exposed to structural change and which, in the view of the Commission, „[...] can feed political opposition to open trade“ (Commission of the European Communities 2006). In order to prevent this opposition, the Commission generally wants to remove obstacles to adjustment in the internal market and move resources to sectors where they can be used most efficiently to create new jobs. It thus becomes relatively clear that the Commission’s strategy is not to protect certain industries which are under strong pressure of international competition per se but rather to support workers who loose jobs to find new ones. This is also the rationale of the Globalisation adjustment Fund (EGF) which was created in 2006.

Of course, it is not primarily the EU-level discourse and the communication strategy of the Commission which are likely to shape citizens' perceptions of globalisation trends and their relationship to the EU-level of policy-making. Political communication in national political arenas, the political cues provided by national parties are much more likely to influence citizens' opinions and attitudes. But it is quite easy to find discourses similar to the "globalisation script" of the European Union on the level of political parties, too. Thus, the Party of European Socialists (PES) states in its common manifesto for the 2009 European elections: "For us, the European Union is the vital link in the era of globalisation. It puts our countries in a stronger position to solve global problems that have an impact locally." (PES 2009: 9). Similar arguments which

underline the globalisation-shaping character of European Union policy-making can be found in many national programmes and statements of Social Democratic and Socialist Parties and also of parties of the mainstream right. Of course, there are differences, mainstream right parties and "third way" parties such as New Labour on the left are embracing globalisation much more enthusiastically than French socialists, the German Social democrats taking a middle ground.

If it were true that citizens' support for the process of European integration is tightly linked to their support for the phenomenon of globalisation, then discourses presenting the European level of policy-making as the pertinent level which provides appropriate means for making citizens benefit from globalisation and shielding them from its negative side effects might turn out to be convincing only for those who have a rather positive outlook on globalisation anyway but much less so for those with a critical outlook on the effects of globalisation.

3. Globalisation and European integration: Basis for a new political cleavage?

Following Kriesi et al. (2008), we start with the assumption that the process of globalisation and the opening up of boundaries has the potential to create a new political cleavage anchored in the social structure of economically advanced countries. Economic globalisation in terms of increased trade, foreign direct investments and free capital flows across borders is creating economic and social disparities, winners and losers. This process enhances (perceived) economic competition between individuals on world wide labour markets, between companies in global markets, and competition between states and their welfare state regimes, tax regimes or regulatory regimes. It also enhances (perceived) cultural competition in the sense that immigrants with a different ethnic and/or religious background are often seen as a threat to the collective identity, mainly the national identity, because they challenge the life styles of the native population. Thus, globalisation can be perceived by potential losers of this process as posing a threat to their jobs, social status, social welfare entitlements, collective identity and cultural life styles. It provides a structural basis of political conflict and creates a political potential for mobilisation of anti-globalisation movements and for parties offering a "losers' programme" (ibid., p. 18), highly critical of economic and/or cultural aspects of globalisation.

The new political conflicts, framed in terms of economic and cultural consequences of globalisation, do not replace earlier socio-political cleavages. Issues of globalisation are embedded in the space of political competition of Western democracies, partially redefining and transforming the meanings of its basic economic and cultural cleavage dimensions (Kriesi et al. 2008: 13). The degree to which issues of European integration are embedded in existing cleavages, especially the left-right divide defined in terms of economic issues, is contested in the literature (for a short overview, cf.

Steenbergen/Marks 2004). Some authors see European integration issues as part of a cultural cleavage dimension, supporters of European integration having also a liberal outlook on cultural issues such as immigration, whereas critics of the EU would side with those opposed to further immigration (Grunberg and Schweisguth 1997). Others see European integration issues partly linked to issues of socio-economic regulation (Hooghe and Marks 1999).

The important point here is not the exact nature of the relationship between globalisation and European integration on the one hand and longstanding political cleavages on the other. These relationships are complex and are dependent on pre-existing national cleavage structures and are shaped by basic features of the national party systems. What matters to us is rather the relationship between attitudes towards globalisation and attitudes towards European integration, and more specifically towards the role the EU can play in that process.

Our first assumption is that attitudes towards globalisation and towards European integration are closely linked. Factors accounting for attitudes towards the European level of policy-making might also contribute to explaining attitudes towards the broader process of globalisation. Attitudes towards the process of globalisation and towards the EU might be seen as being embedded in a broader value-dimension underlying these more specific attitudes. Grunberg and Schweisguth (1997: 162-172) hinted to the emergence of a value-based cleavage opposing universalist (or cosmopolitan) and anti-universalist outlooks. It seems highly likely that universalist values are also tightly linked to a positive outlook on the process of globalisation and anti-universalist values to a negative outlook. Thus, critical attitudes towards globalisation should go along with a critical view of the EU's role in this process, the EU being indeed seen as instance of globalisation on a reduced geographical scale. Hence, our first hypothesis:

(H1) Attitudes towards the process of globalisation and the degree of confidence with regard to the EU's protective or benign role in that process are positively correlated.

The likelihood to see the emergence of an important and lasting political cleavage separating inward-looking citizens, focused on the framework of the nation state, from those who support international/supranational forms of governance and the removal of borders is the greater the less European integration and globalisation are seen as two distinct phenomena.

4. What accounts for (patterns of) attitudes towards globalisation and the EU's role therein?

As dependent variables, we use (1) a question asking people whether they think that the EU protects them from negative effects of globalisation, (2) an index capturing the

extent of positive evaluations of different (but correlated) facets of globalisation and (3) an index intended to measure attitudes towards economic, trade-related aspects of globalisation (see Annex 1 for a detailed description of variable construction).

When looking for factors which might account for attitudes on globalisation and the EU's more or less benign role in that process, we distinguish between individual-level-factors and national context factors. This is due to our assumption that national contexts, in terms of nation-specific economic situations, societal trends, features of the cleavage structures and party systems and last but not least in terms of differences in elite discourses on globalisation and European integration (and their relationship) are highly important for our understanding of the role people ascribe to the EU. Individual-level attitudes and individual-level patterns of attitudes are thus seen to be influenced by national political contexts. We start by looking at individual-level factors accounting for globalisation-related attitudes and perceptions of the EU's role in it and then turn to national context-level factors which might explain the differences which can be found on an aggregated level between the EU's member states.

a) Individual-level hypotheses

Following a logic of economic interests, based on professional skills or factor endowments of individuals, some authors (e.g. Schwartz 2001) see the (potential) "losers of globalisation" mainly coming either from the private sectors of the economy relatively sheltered from the pressures of open world markets or the public administration / public sector.² According to a Heckscher-Ohlin trade theory logic which has dominated the literature on trade policy attitudes, workers with low levels of education and/or professional skills in skill-abundant countries are vulnerable to increased international competition and to the spread of supply chains on a worldwide scale. The (potential) winners of globalisation would thus be the highly educated and highly skilled persons and those in the internationally competitive sectors of the economy of economically advanced countries. Professional skills equip individuals with a stock of human capital enabling them to seize the economic opportunities of globalisation thanks to their highly valued resources on the labour market. These are giving them an "exit option" through professional and geographical mobility which less skilled workers/employees clearly lack. A high stock of personal skills, making people adaptable to changing labour markets, should lead to more positive perceptions of different facets of globalisation, especially economic and trade-related facets, and to a more confident perception of the EU's role in it.

² Our data set does unfortunately not contain information on the economic sector of employment, so that we cannot test this hypothesis.

Thus, the individual's endowment with resources to cope with the economic challenges of economic globalisation is, according to an interest-based, utilitarian logic, of key importance for understanding attitudes towards the opening of national borders. Due to data limitations (e.g. lack of an income variable), we rely on information on education and professional positions available in our data set, variables which should indirectly tap the professional skills of respondents.

(H2) The level of education is positively related to the general endorsement of the process of globalisation and to a positive view of the EU's protective/enabling role in that process.³

(H3) Higher professional positions are associated with more positive attitudes towards globalisation and the EU's protective/enabling role in that process.

But education and a higher social status (in terms of the profession) is also equipping the individual with social and cultural capital which makes it easier to embrace the entire "openness package", not only the economic parts of it, thanks to more universalist and cosmopolitan outlooks associated with higher levels of education and higher positions on the social stratification ladder. Level of education is, thus, not an unambiguous variable and cannot be claimed to support only economic interest-based explanations in line with the factor endowment model.

Globalisation is also often perceived as a threat on cultural grounds. Opposition to the further opening of national borders, especially in terms of immigration, can also be rooted in particularistic, nationalistic and anti-universal values and world views. As we know from comparative research on values and value change, higher levels of education are conducive to values of tolerance, to universalist and cosmopolitan values and to increased openness towards foreign cultures (Ester, Halman and de Moor 1994; Norris 2000, p. 162).

According to previous research, economic and cultural aspects of globalisation are not easily disentangled by individuals: "...many individuals do not assess the economic effects of market openness independently of the *non-economic* effects they associate with the openness 'package'. The complex and all-encompassing nature of globalization means that, for many, attitudes towards trade are inseparably tied to views on other changes that come with openness, be they demographic, technological or cultural changes" (Margalit 2006: 3; emphasis in original). Thus, interest-based attitudes are mixed up with identity-based attitudes. In a similar vein, previous research on support for the EU has shown that utilitarian concerns and perceived cultural threats to the national identity both are part of the explanation for sceptical attitudes towards the EU

³ For the exact operationalisation of independent and dependent variables, see Annex 1.

(McLaren 2002; Hooghe and Marks 2004; for an analysis focusing on the importance of interest-related variables for EU support, see Gabel 1998).

Thus, it might be quite difficult to predict general attitudes towards globalisation and the EU's role in that process on the basis of the precise location of the individual in the labour market and on the basis of skill-related variables such as income and education alone. But if we look more specifically at trade-related aspects of globalisation, then these skills and professional status-related variables might gain in importance. This was at least a finding of a study conducted by Wolfe and Mendelsohn in Canada (Wolfe/Mendelsohn 2005, 57-58). It seems plausible that the pattern uncovered in Canada might also hold true for European Union members' populations. Contrary to this finding, Margalit (2006: 4) makes the claim that individual perceptions of the economic effects of trade openness are less based on utilitarian calculations than on anxieties about the pervasive cultural changes linked to the process of globalisation. In order to test these competing claims, we state the following hypothesis.

(H4) Education and professional position are more closely related to attitudes on trade-related aspects of globalisation than to more general outlooks on the globalisation process or the EU's role therein.

Another factor which should be conducive to critical attitudes towards globalisation and the EU's role in that process is the worsening of the economic and financial situation of individuals and families. Individuals who are worse off today than in the past might attribute this change in their individual life chances and material conditions to the opening of borders and increased economic competition or the perception of increased group conflict between natives and immigrant groups competing for scarce resources. Our data set contains a variable asking people to compare the present purchasing power of their household to that of five years ago. People reporting a loss of purchasing power might have experienced a process of social downward mobility which they can attribute to the forces unleashed by globalisation and/or European economic market integration.

(H5) A loss of purchasing power over time is associated with negative attitudes towards globalisation and towards the protective role of the EU.

But it is not only a deterioration of the financial situation of individuals and their families which might breed opposition to globalisation, but also the perception that the economy of one's country is underperforming. Sociotropic economic attitudes and assessments of the country's overall employment situation might, besides egocentric evaluations, influence attitudes towards globalisation.

(H6) Negative evaluation of one's country's relative employment performance are related to negative attitudes towards globalisation and the EU's role in it.

Besides these variables reflecting the social and economic position and evaluations of the respondent, a number of political variables are likely to be influential. We consider left-right self-placement and attitudes on important economic and cultural issues to be major factors influencing our dependent variables.

With regard to self-placement on the left-right scale, we assume a divide between the far left and far right on the one hand and the centre-left and centre-right on the other hand. Those on the extremes of the left-right spectrum are more likely than those taking the middle ground to hold the EU either responsible for reinforcing the neo-liberal logic of globalisation, a typical issue of left-wing populist or extremist parties, or for the influx of (unwelcomed) immigrants, a core issue for right-wing populist and extremist parties. This assumption is based on well established empirical findings with respect to the relationship between support of European integration and the self-placement on a left-right scale. On the level of political parties, too, we find an inverted U-shape when charting the positions of party families on a left-right dimension combined with a second dimension indicating level of support for European integration (Hooghe/Marks/Wilson 2002).

(H7) Individuals placing themselves on the extreme ends of the left-right scale are more sceptical towards globalisation and the EU's "globalisation script".

Apart from this self-positioning on the abstract ideological left-right dimension, we assume that attitudes on core issues of the economic and cultural cleavage dimensions structuring the political space are connected with attitudes on globalisation and the EU's role therein. Those who are in general supportive of the free market should also be supportive of transnational economic competition which sets free market forces, contributes to a more efficient allocation of resources and to higher productivity and prosperity. This should find its expression in pro-globalisation attitudes and lead them to support the EU's globalisation script.

(H8) Respondents with pro-market attitudes are more likely to embrace globalisation, especially economic globalisation, and subscribe to the beneficial role of the EU in the process of globalisation.

Attitudes towards immigration are highly likely to be correlated with those towards globalisation and the EU's more or less protective role. Immigration not only is for many citizens a highly visible and polarizing aspect of globalisation; it is also a favourite issue for political mobilisation used by rightist parties with an anti-EU and an anti-globalisation agenda.

(H9) Respondents who see in general beneficial effects of immigration for their countries are more likely to embrace globalisation and to subscribe to the EU's globalisation script.

b) National-level context factors

On the macro-level of EU member states, we assume that differences in the overall distribution of attitudes towards globalisation and the EU's globalisation-shaping or mitigating role might be related to a number of economic, social and political context variables. We consider the following as deserving special attention: the degree of economic globalisation for a given country, its growth dynamic, its level of unemployment, its trends in social inequality, and the political discourses related to economic protectionism. We are not asserting that the "objective" factors referred to above have a direct impact on the attitudes of mass publics. But they do serve as more or less convincing building blocks for discourses and rhetoric strategies of political actors to construct social reality.

A high degree of economic openness in terms of high trade flows and low levels of trade restrictions, high levels of foreign direct investments and portfolio investments should be associated with a pattern of relatively positive attitudes towards globalisation. In general terms, a high score on an index of economic globalisation indicates that many people in these countries have an economic stake in open European and global markets. *(H10) Countries with a high degree of economic globalisation display more positive patterns of attitudes towards globalisation and towards the European globalisation script compared to countries with lower scores on the economic globalisation variable.*

Further, we assume that a sustained growth dynamic makes many individuals feel the benefits of globalisation and should at the same time reduce distributive conflicts, including inter-group conflicts, by enlarging the pie to be distributed. High and sustained growth rates might have another highly important consequence. They support the diffusion of a general mood of social optimism because of the credible promise of better material conditions in the future. This should make it easier for individuals to see the opportunities and not only the threats of the opening of borders and of an increasing economic, societal and cultural interpenetration of their social systems. Hence, high growth rates should be conducive to pro-globalisation attitudes and should also make the EU's globalisation script more convincing.

(H11) Countries with high growth rates should embrace globalisation and subscribe to the EU's globalisation script to a higher degree than countries with lower growth rates.

But high growth rates alone are only part of the picture. When different segments of society are drifting apart because of increased social inequality, then support for globalisation and for the EU's globalisation discourse might dwindle. We know from recent studies that a number of European Union member states experienced a trend

towards higher social inequality (OECD 2008). This might affect attitudes towards globalisation and European integration which are quite often blamed for these trends.

(H12) Rising social inequalities in EU member states are associated with a more sceptical average outlook on globalisation and the EU's globalisation script.

We also expect the level of unemployment which people experience in their home countries to be correlated to our dependent variables. It seems plausible that the populations of EU member states experiencing a state of near full employment are more easily convinced of the benefits of open markets and open borders than those having to struggle with very high levels of unemployment and all the economic, fiscal, social and political consequences this entails.

(H13) Higher unemployment rates in a country are conducive to more critical patterns of attitudes towards globalisation and the EU's role in mitigating its negative effects.

Last but not least, we must account for the importance of subjective interpretations thanks to political cues which people are given by parties or social movements or media coverage in their respective national political arenas. We will concentrate on party cues in terms of protectionist discourses which can be found in party manifestos. By using data from the Euromanifesto project, we are able to tap the importance of protectionist discourses in national political debates. Our hypothesis is straightforward:

(H14) The higher the frequency of protectionist arguments to be found in party manifestos of a given member state, the more likely is a critical stance of its population on globalisation and the EU's globalisation script.

5. Data source and method

We used a recent Eurobarometer data set, one of the rare data sources combining questions on different aspects of globalisation on the one hand and the role of the EU on the other hand. Field research for Eurobarometer 69.2 was conducted from March to May 2008, i.e. right before the acceleration of the financial market crisis. Unfortunately, as almost always in secondary research using existing data sets, there are severe shortcomings limiting the range of issues which can be investigated based on this data source. First of all, the social structural location of individuals was not investigated in a detailed way by the primary researchers. There are, for instance, no indications on the exact professional situation – in the private or public sector, in an export-oriented or inward-looking sector of the economy – which would have enabled us to test with more rigour hypotheses linking the social structural location of individuals to their attitudes towards globalisation along the lines of the factor endowment or Heckscher-Ohlin model.

There are further limitations: For the major question of interest for us on the EU's role in the process of globalisation, the primary researchers used a split variable, asking half of the respondents in each member state one variant of the question and using a different wording for the other half of the respondents. This makes it difficult to run multivariate analysis on the level of individual EU member states because of the limited number of cases available. We used the comprehensive data set covering all member states of the EU even though we are aware of the importance of national context factors. That is one reason why we use a multi-level design, introducing the above mentioned context factors into our regression models estimating the effects of both individual-level and country-level variables.


6. Empirical Results

We first present and discuss the overall distribution of answers to the question on the role of the EU in the globalisation process. Then we test the first hypothesis assuming a relationship between attitudes towards globalisation and the EU, reporting correlations between our three dependent variables and a fourth variable measuring the level of utilitarian support of the EU. Finally we report and discuss the results of three different two-level regression models regressing the same set of independent variables on our three dependent variables.

a) Overall distribution at the level of member states

According to our data (graph 1), the Commission's globalisation rhetoric (or script) seems to be only partly convincing for the populations of the member states. We find absolute majorities subscribing to the idea that the EU enables citizens to better benefit from the positive effects of globalisation in 14 out of 27 member states and relative majorities in 22. But relative majorities in Austria, France, Germany, Greece, and Slovenia clearly disagree with this point of view. The idea of the EU serving as a shield or bulwark against negative effects of globalisation seems to be less frequently shared than the idea of the EU enabling its citizens to reap the benefits of the opening of borders. There are only five member states – Denmark, Belgium, the Netherlands, Sweden and Portugal – where absolute majorities of citizens see the EU as a protection against negative effects of globalisation, but 15 more member states where we can at least find relative majorities agreeing with this point of view.

Graph 1: The EU protects from globalisation / enables people to benefit from globalisation



Source: Eurobarometer 69-2 (march-may 2008)

Relative majorities explicitly disagreeing with the statement that the EU is helping to protect us against the negative effects of globalisation can be found in six member states: Austria, France, Germany, Greece, Latvia and Slovenia. Interestingly enough, if we do not look at the entire UK, but only to Great Britain, we can also find a small relative majority disagreeing with the idea of the EU serving as a bulwark against globalisation, an intriguing finding in a country where successive governments strongly embraced economic globalisation (data not shown).

On the level of the EU's member states, there is no clear-cut pattern to be found at first sight. There is no North-South- or East-West-divide. The EU's founding member states are not grouping together. Populations from member states belonging to different types

of welfare state regimes (Scandinavian, Bismarckian, Southern European and Eastern European) do not systematically display similar response patterns.

But what is clearly visible is the fact that the enabling and protecting role of the EU with respect to the positive and negative aspects of globalisation are evaluated in a differentiated manner. Thus, the two different question wordings used by the primary researchers are indeed measuring different aspects of attitudes towards the EU's role in the process of globalisation. We will use the first variant of the question on the EU's protective role for further analyses because it seems more interesting on political grounds to analyse the empirical correlates of clearly negative views of the EU's protective role, given that "protectionist" discourses with respect to globalisation seem to have gained ground in recent years and, of course, since the start of the current economic crisis.

b) Relationships between indicators of globalisation, EU-support and the EU's role in globalisation

In order to test our first hypothesis (H1) stating that attitudes towards the process of globalisation and the degree of confidence with regard to the EU's protective or benign role in that process are positively correlated, we report simple bivariate correlations between our two globalisation indices and a widely used question tapping utilitarian support for the EU and, finally the "EU helps to protect" question used above (table 1).

Table 1: Correlations between globalisation and European integration indicators

| | EU helps to protect us from negative effects of globalisation | Country benefits from EU membership | General globalisation endorsement | Globalisation as threat to employment |
|---|---|-------------------------------------|-----------------------------------|---------------------------------------|
| EU helps to protect us from negative effects of globalisation | 1.00 | | | |
| Country benefits from EU membership | 0.31* | 1.00 | | |
| General globalisation endorsement | 0.40* | 0.27* | 1.00 | |
| Globalisation as threat to employment | -0.33* | -0.25* | -0.44* | 1.00 |

Pearson's r; *=p<0.05, EU-27 weighted according to country size.

Those who see the multi-faceted process of globalisation in a rather positive way (index "general globalisation endorsement") are indeed much more likely than people with less positive views to attribute the EU a protective role with regard to the dark sides of globalisation (r=0.4). This pattern holds true for all the member states of the EU (data

not shown)⁴. On the other hand, those who hold the view that globalisation is threatening employment and companies in their country are less likely than others to attribute the EU a protective role in the process of globalisation. EU-level and national actors using the rhetoric of the EU's globalisation script seem to be preaching to the already converted. But their discourse is much less convincing for those for whom it was developed in the first place, people who see globalisation as an economic threat and tend more generally to find little positive aspects in the phenomenon of globalisation.

Respondents having a positive view of the EU and seeing their country benefitting from EU membership tend to attribute the EU-level of policy-making a protective role with respect to negative effects of globalisation ($r=0.31$). They are also more likely to endorse the process of globalisation ($r=0.27$) and to disagree with the statement that globalisation is threatening employment and companies in their countries ($r= -.25$). We are dealing here with "Europeanized" and internationalised/globalised outlooks, even though the medium magnitude of the correlation coefficients tells us that our indicators for support for globalisation and for European integration are not simply measuring the same underlying phenomenon. Nevertheless, hypothesis 1 stating that attitudes towards the process of globalisation and towards the EU's protective or benign role in that process are positively correlated is confirmed by the data. This lends some credibility to our assumption that the independent variables explaining the degree of support for globalisation and for the EU's protecting role in that process might also display a high degree of similarity.

c) Results from regression models

Let us now turn to multiple regression models estimating the effects of different independent variables simultaneously.

In order to allow for comparisons, we estimated three models with our two different globalisation indices (models 2+3) and the (recoded) question on the EU's protective role in the process of globalisation (model 1) as dependent variables, respectively (table 2). A number of our hypotheses are confirmed, but there are also quite intriguing results to be found.

First, there is little empirical confirmation of a cleavage theoretical approach to attitudes towards globalisation and the EU's role in shaping globalisation or mitigating its negative effects. Education, used as an indicator for the human capital or factor endowment of individuals, is not significantly related to our three dependent variables in the three models we estimated. This confirms findings of Gerhards and Hessel

⁴ In Spain and Cyprus, some correlations are not statistically significant, but the signs are the same as in all the other member states.

(2008). Using a different data set, they found that education is only very weakly (and even negatively!) or, depending on the models they tested, not at all related to attitudes towards globalisation when controlling for subjective calculations of the benefits of globalisation. These findings stand in clear contrast to the effect of education on support for European integration for which it could be shown time and again to be a powerful predictor. Thus, scepticism towards globalisation and the EU's role in that process is by no means limited to citizens with lower levels of formal education.

When looking at the professional categories of respondents, we find no significant effects in the reported categories (manual workers serving as the reference category) for our main question asking for an evaluation of the EU's role in the process of globalisation (model 1). And we found only small effects when using our index of fears of negative employment effects of globalisation as dependent variable (model 3). In the ranks of self-employed respondents and white collar employees, fears of negative economic consequences of globalisation in terms of employment and relocations of companies were slightly less frequent than in the ranks of manual workers. For the category where one might think to find the highest share of "losers of globalisation", the unemployed, we found no significant effects at all compared to the attitudes of manual workers and controlling for the other variables in our model. Thus, there is only scant evidence for an important role of the individual's social structural location for his/her attitudes towards globalisation. But we cannot exclude that our measurement instruments, lacking precision with regard to the individual's social structural location, fail to uncover the social structural basis of an anti-globalisation cleavage.

Our hypotheses 4, stating that education and professional position are more closely related to attitudes on trade-related aspects of globalisation than to more general outlooks on the globalisation process or the EU's role therein is partly confirmed, with regard to the impact of professional positions (but not for education), but this effect is a weak one.

By contrast, we find clear and significant effects of a change in the purchasing power of the respondents' households. An increase is related to positive attitudes, a decrease to negative attitudes towards globalisation (model 2). The same holds true for evaluations of the EU's role in protecting citizens from negative consequences of globalisation (model 1). And, as hypothesized, a decrease in purchasing power seems to make people more critical towards the threats globalisation entails for employment (model 3). Attitudes towards globalisation and the EU's role are not only influenced by these egocentric perceptions of one's purchasing power. They are also influenced by the sociotropic evaluation of the country's employment situation compared to other EU member states which displays the predicted effects in all three models.

Table 2: Explaining attitudes towards globalisation and the EU's protective role (random effects GLS regression with EU member states as level 2)

| | <i>EU helps to protect (Model 1)</i> | | <i>Globalisation endorsement (Model 2)</i> | | <i>Globalisation as threat to employment (Model 3)</i> | |
|--|--|-------|--|-------|--|-------|
| | Coeff. | dy/dx | Coeff. | dy/dx | Coeff. | dy/dx |
| Education | .011 (.009) | .011 | -.020 (.058) | -.020 | -.029 (.016) | -.029 |
| Self-employed† | -.027 (.025) | -.027 | .063 (.145) | .063 | -.090 (.040)* | -.090 |
| Managers | -.015 (.021) | -.015 | .082 (.126) | .082 | -.042 (.034) | -.042 |
| Other white collar | .028 (.021) | .028 | .031 (.126) | .031 | -.089 (.034)* | -.089 |
| Unemployed | -.019 (.031) | -.019 | .268 (.181) | .268 | -.064 (.050) | -.064 |
| Household purchasing power | .073 (.008)* | .073 | .421 (.047)* | .421 | -.130 (.013)* | -.130 |
| Employment situation in country | .039 (.008)* | .039 | .384 (.052)* | .384 | -.085 (.014)* | -.085 |
| Free competition | .069 (.007)* | .069 | .828 (.043)* | .828 | -.134 (.012)* | -.134 |
| Migrants contribute | .075 (.007)* | .075 | .539 (.041)* | .539 | -.110 (.011)* | -.110 |
| Left extremist | -.029 (.023) | -.029 | -.121 (.134) | -.121 | .016 (.037) | .016 |
| Right extremist | .034 (.023) | .034 | .013 (.135)* | .013 | -.040 (.037) | -.040 |
| KOF globalisation index | .005 (.001)* | .005 | .047 (.040) | .047 | -.002 (.005) | -.002 |
| GDP growth | -.016 (.004)* | -.016 | .012 (.089) | .012 | -.007 (.013) | -.007 |
| Inequality | -.000 (.001) | -.000 | .014 (.028) | .014 | .002 (.004) | .002 |
| Unemployment | .016 (.005)* | .016 | .108 (.107) | .108 | -.013 (.015) | -.013 |
| Protectionism | .000 (.000) | .000 | -.002 (.003) | -.002 | .000 (.000) | .000 |
| Constant | .414 (.187)* | | 3.66 (3.86)* | | 2.58 (.574)* | |
| sigma_u | .02446308 | | .84709476 | | .11588778 | |
| sigma_e | .46931076 | | 2.7110066 | | .74711695 | |
| rho | .00270971 | | .08894983 | | .02349485 | |
| R² | 0.0882 | | 0.1611 | | 0.1083 | |

*=p<0.05, † reference category= manual worker, unstandardised coefficients with standard errors in parentheses, dy/dx=marginal effects, N=6174, EU-25 weighted according to country size, all models include controls for age and gender. *Source*: Eurobarometer 69-2 (own computation).

Our hypothesis (H7) claiming that individuals placing themselves on the extreme ends of the left-right scale are more sceptical towards globalisation and the EU's "globalisation script" is only partly confirmed. It does not hold true for evaluation of the

EU's role. And for those at the extreme right end of the left-right scale, we see a significant effect only for general attitudes towards globalisation (model 2), whereas a self-placement on the extreme left of the left-right scale is, when controlling for the other variables in our models, not significantly related to attitudes towards globalisation. This is counter-intuitive. But it might be due to the inclusion of attitudes towards free competition in our model, which are related to left-right self-placement.

We can indeed find a highly significant impact of the support for free competition "as the best guarantee for economic prosperity" on the general attitudes towards globalisation (model 2) and more specifically towards its economic aspects (model 3). The question we used, tapping a core attitude of the economic left-right dimension, is clearly structuring attitudes towards globalisation and the EU's role in it (model 1). If we look at the marginal effects of the variables in the model (dy/dx) which allow for comparisons of the strength of the individual variables, we see that attitudes towards free competition come first in our models 2 and 3 and third in model 1. Endorsing (or not) free competition clearly makes a difference.

The same holds true for attitudes towards immigrants and their contribution to the respondent's country. The more negative attitudes towards immigrants, the more negative are attitudes towards globalisation and the EU's role in it. This item, tapping a cultural cleavage dimension, is the most important variable in our first model and has a clear and significant impact in the other two models, too.

Contrary to our expectations, the national-level factors turn out to be not very important. The degree of economic globalisation of the country is significantly related to evaluations of the EU's role in the process of globalisation (model 1), but not so to the process of globalisation as such (models 2+3).

Inequality trends and the frequency of protectionist arguments to be found in political programmes (Euromanifestos) are not significantly related to our dependent variables. The former is a quite interesting finding. In a number of EU member states, as for example in Germany, the issues of rising inequalities and of a decline of the middle classes were high on the political agenda these last years – and this trend was usually related to the process of economic globalisation. The latter result might simply be due to the imprecise nature of our variable trying to capture and to quantify contents of public political discourses. Better instruments might produce different results.

The most intriguing findings of our models are the significant correlations between GDP growth dynamic and unemployment on the one hand and the evaluation of the EU's protective role with respect to the negative effects of globalisation on the other hand. In national contexts characterized by higher unemployment and a lower pace of GDP growth, evaluations of the EU's role in globalisation seem to be more positive,

when controlling for the other variables included in this model. This is not due to specific effects of individual member states. When introducing dummy variables for 25 member states⁵ in order to capture non-explained, country-specific effects, the unexpected effects of unemployment level and GDP growth dynamic are still visible. Further research must show whether this intriguing finding is due to bad data quality or whether a substantive explanation might be advanced to explain it. Table 3 summarizes our hypothesis and the degree of confirmation we found.

Table 3: Hypotheses and results: Summary

| | Hypothesis | Degree of confirmation |
|-----|--|--|
| H1 | Attitudes towards globalisation and evaluations of the EU's role in it positively correlated | confirmed |
| H2 | Impact of education | not confirmed |
| H3 | Impact of professional status | only partly and weakly confirmed |
| H4 | Education and professional position are more closely related to attitudes on trade-related aspects of globalisation than to more general outlooks on globalisation / EU's role therein | confirmed only for professional position, weak effect |
| H5 | Impact of a loss in purchasing power | confirmed |
| H6 | Impact of negative evaluation with regard to the employment situation | confirmed |
| H7 | Impact of self-placement at the extreme left or right end of left-right scale | partly confirmed, but only for right-wing respondents' general attitudes towards globalisation |
| H8 | Impact of pro-market attitudes | confirmed |
| H9 | Impact of pro-migration attitudes | confirmed |
| H10 | Impact of degree of globalisation | partly confirmed (only model 1: EU's role) |
| H11 | Impact of GDP growth dynamic (2000-07) | significant in model 1, but in an unexpected direction |
| H12 | Impact of trend in social inequality | not confirmed |
| H13 | Impact of unemployment | significant in model 1, but in an unexpected direction |
| H14 | Impact of protectionist arguments in public discourse (party manifestos) | not confirmed |

7. Conclusion

We took a cleavage approach as our theoretical starting point, hypothesising that the process of globalisation, producing winners and losers in economic as well as in cultural

⁵ Bulgaria and Romania had to be left out due to a lack of data on the protectionism variable because they did not participate in the 2004 European Parliament elections.

terms, might produce a new political cleavage, redefining the contents and meaning of older socio-economic and cultural cleavages. If a growing group of "losers of globalisation" were to emerge and to develop critical attitudes towards open borders and economic, social and cultural interpenetration of societies, then it is of crucial importance for students of the EU to know how these attitudes towards globalisation are related to evaluations of the EU's role in that process and to the legitimacy resources of the EU. We found that globalisation and EU-related attitudes are indeed related.

We found important parts of the population of the EU's member states which were not convinced by the positive rhetoric or "globalisation script" the EU (here: the Commission) has developed. But the critics are not concentrated among those with lower educational levels, in the ranks of manual workers or the unemployed. There might be a globalisation cleavage, but it seems to be less anchored in the social structure than some authors claim. But we cannot exclude at this point that this is due to an imprecise measurement of the social-structural location of individuals, for instance with regard to their exact employment sector.

Attitudes towards globalisation are clearly related and structured by attitudes towards free competition and the market – an old economic left-right issue – and attitudes towards immigrants, a more recent issue at the core of a cultural cleavage dimension in many EU member states. These general attitudes towards free competition and towards immigrants can be thought of as being causal antecedents of attitudes towards globalisation and the EU's role in it.

In the light of these findings, it seems possible that when looking at attitudes towards globalisation and the EU's mitigating or globalisation-shaping role, we are dealing with an important and potentially lasting attitudinal issue-dimension structuring current political conflicts but lacking a clear-cut social structural base. Further research is needed on this crucial point.

With regard to the role of national context factors in shaping attitudes towards globalisation and the EU's protective role, we found that "objective" socio-economic context factors are either not as important as we thought (rising social inequality, degree of globalisation) or display the "wrong" sign (growth dynamic and level of unemployment). One major conclusion we draw from these findings (apart from testing our hypotheses again on different data sets) is to try to include party system features in our analysis and to tap globalisation-related contents of party programmes and elite discourses to improve our understanding of the way objective socio-economic conditions are filtered and interpreted in different political systems.

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Appendix 1: Description of variables

| Variable | (Re-)Coding | Source |
|--|---|--|
| Dependent Variables | | |
| EU helps to protect us from negative effects of globalisation | <p><u>Question:</u> <i>To what extent do you agree or disagree with the following statement: The European Union helps to protect us from the negative effects of globalisation</i></p> <p><u>Original coding:</u> (1) totally agree, (2) tend to agree, (3) tend to disagree, (4) totally disagree, (5) dk</p> <p><u>Re-coding:</u> (1) totally disagree, (2) tend to disagree, (3) tend to agree, (4) totally agree, (5) missing</p> | Euro-barometer (EB) 69.2 (March-May 2008), QA49a |
| Globalisation endorsement | <p><u>Question:</u> <i>For each of the following statements please tell me whether you strongly agree, somewhat agree, somewhat disagree or strongly disagree.</i></p> <p>We have created an additive index of the following items:</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> ▪ <i>G. is an opportunity for economic growth</i> ▪ <i>G. helps peace in the world</i> ▪ <i>G. means more foreign investments in (COUNTRY)</i> ▪ <i>G. helps the development of poorer countries</i> ▪ <i>G. helps people to be more open to external cultures</i> <p>The answering category strongly agree was coded with (4), somewhat agree with (3), somewhat disagree with (2) and strongly disagree with (1) respectively. Dk was coded as missing.</p> <p>The Cronbach's Alpha [EU-27] for the index is 0.7703</p> | EB 69.2 QA47a |
| Trade-related aspects of globalisation | <p><u>Question QA48a:</u> <i>Which of the following two propositions is the one which is closest to your opinion with regard to globalisation?</i></p> <ol style="list-style-type: none"> (1) G. represents a good opportunity for our community's companies thanks to the opening-up of markets. (2) G. represents a threat to employment and companies in our community. (3) Dk. <p><u>Re-coding:</u> (0) G. represents a good opportunity for our community's companies thanks to the opening-up of markets, (1) G. represents a threat to employment and companies in our community, (3) missing</p> <p><u>Question QA51a:</u> <i>There are multiple consequences of the globalisation of trade. When you hear the word "globalisation", what comes first to your mind?</i></p> <ol style="list-style-type: none"> (1) Relocation of some companies where labour is cheaper. (2) Increased competition for (NATIONAL) companies. (3) Opportunities for (nationality) companies (4) Foreign investments in (our country) <p><i>One answer possible.</i></p> <p>We have created an additive index summarizing the answer to the first question (QA48a) and if the respondent answered that globalisation either leads to increased competition (2) or relocation of companies (1) to question QA51a.</p> <p>The Cronbach's Alpha [EU-27] for the index is 0.5922</p> | EB 69.2 QA48a & QA51a |

| Micro-Level Independent Variables | | |
|--|---|-------------------|
| Education | <u>Question:</u> <i>How old were you when you finished full-time education?</i> | EB 69.2 D8 |
| Age | <u>Question:</u> <i>How old are you?</i> | EB 69.2 D11 |
| Male - Female | Gender: (0) male, (1) female | EB 69.2 D10 |
| Occupation | Respondent's current occupation. Dummy variables for the listed occupational categories. <u>Manual worker</u> represents the reference category. | EB 69.2 D15 |
| Free competition | <u>Question:</u> <i>For each of the following propositions, tell me if you...? Free competition is the best guarantee for economic prosperity!</i> <u>Original coding:</u> (1) totally agree, (2) tend to agree, (3) tend to disagree, (4) totally disagree, (5) dk <u>Re-coding:</u> (1) totally disagree, (2) tend to disagree, (3) tend to agree, (4) totally agree, (5) missing | EB 69.2 GD1a |
| Immigration | <u>Question:</u> <i>For each of the following propositions, tell me if you...? Immigrants contribute a lot to (OUR COUNTRY)!</i> <u>Original coding:</u> (1) totally agree, (2) tend to agree, (3) tend to disagree, (4) totally disagree, (5) dk <u>Re-coding:</u> (1) totally disagree, (2) tend to disagree, (3) tend to agree, (4) totally agree, (5) missing | EB 69.2 GD1a |
| Household purchasing power | <u>Question:</u> <i>Thinking about your purchase power, that is to say the things that your household can afford in your daily life. If you compare your present situation with five years ago, would you say it has improved, stayed about the same, or got worse?</i> <u>Original coding:</u> (1) improved, (2) stayed about the same, (3) got worse, (4) dk <u>Re-coding:</u> (1) got worse, (2) stayed about the same (3) improved, (4) missing | EB 69.2 GA27 |
| Employment situation in country | <u>Question:</u> <i>For each of the following domains, would you say that the situation in (your COUNTRY) is better or less good compared to the average of the European Union? The employment situation in (COUNTRY)</i> <u>Original coding:</u> (1) much better, (2) somewhat better, (3) somewhat less good, (4) definitely less good, (5) dk <u>Re-coding:</u> (1) definitely less good, (2) somewhat less good (3) somewhat better, (4) much better, (5) missing | EB 69.2 GA5a_2 |
| Left & Right extreme | <u>Question:</u> <i>In political matters people talk of "the left" and "the right". How would you place your views on this scale?</i> The scale ranges from 1 (left) to 10 (right) in terms of their political orientation. The data set includes one variable recoding the answers into 5 categories: (1-2) left, (3-4) middle-left, (5-6) centre, (7-8) middle-right and (9-10) right. Based on these five categories we have created dummy variables for each category with the centre (5-6) serving as the reference category. <u>Left extreme</u> thus refers to scale positions 1-2, <u>right extreme</u> to the scale positions 9-10 | EB 69.2 D1 |

| Contextual Variables | | |
|--------------------------------|---|---|
| Unemployment | Unemployed persons as a percentage of the labour force for the year 2007. | Eurostat – Structural indicators, Online data base |
| Inequality | <p>Overall trends in income inequality, measured by the percentage change (negative as well as positive percentages) of the Gini coefficient between the years 2000 and 2007.</p> <p>Due to data limitations the start year for the Czech Republic, Denmark and Sweden is 2001. For Cyprus it is 2003 and 2005 for Slovakia. In Bulgaria and Romania the end year is 2006.</p> | Eurostat – Population and Social Conditions Online data bench (own calculations) |
| GDP growth | Average annual real GDP growth rate in percent between 2000 and 2007. | Eurostat – Structural Indicators Online data bank (own calculations) |
| KOF globalisation index | <p>This variable is based on the KOF Globalisation Index which is provided by the ETH Zurich.</p> <p>The index contains measures of economic, social as well as political globalisation. For the purpose of this study we use the index for economic globalisation. Broadly speaking it contains measures of economic flows such as foreign direct and portfolio investment as well as trade. In addition, the index also contains a measure of existing restrictions on trade and capital using hidden import barriers, mean tariff rates, taxes on international trade as well as an index of capital controls. We have used the index for the year 2006 (the most recent year available).</p> | <p>KOF globalisation index</p> <p>URL: http://globalization.kof.ethz.ch/</p> |
| Protectionism | <p>The variable was generated on the basis of the Euromanifesto Study 2004. It contains the frequency with which different political issues were mentioned in the party election programmes for the EP elections 2004 for all 25 EU member states at this time. The data set contains two variables, one capturing the favourable and another variable the unfavourable mentions “[...] of <i>extension or maintenance of tariffs to protect internal markets; other domestic economic protectionism such as quota restrictions in each national party’s programme.</i>”</p> <p>We first have weighted the number of mentions of each party by the percentage share of seats in the respective national parliament (in 2004) and added these numbers in order to receive the coefficient for each country. In a second step we have subtracted the favourable mentions of protectionism from the unfavourable mentions, i.e. “against protectionism” minus “in favour of more protectionism”.</p> <p>In the Euromanifesto study for Belgium, the number of statements related to protectionism is reported separately for Wallonia and Flanders and the percentage of seats-weights in the data set relate to the regional parliaments. Since the Belgian federal or national parliament is more or less composed by proportionality, we have weighted the mentions first according to the respective party’s share of seats in the regional parliament and in a second step every regions share of the total population.</p> <p>No data were available for Bulgaria as well as for Romania since they did not participate in the European Parliament elections 2004, i.e. were not included in the 2004 Euromanifesto study.</p> | <p>Euromanifesto Study 2004</p> <p>URL: http://www.mzes.uni-mannheim.de/projekt_e/manifestos/</p> <p>(own calculations)</p> |

Appendix 2: Description of the contextual variables used for the calculations

| Country | Unemployment rate (in % of labour force in 2007) | Inequality (%-change in Gini coeff. 2000-2007) | GDP growth (2000-2007) | KOF globalisation index (2006) | Protectionism (2004) |
|---------|--|--|---------------------------|-----------------------------------|-------------------------|
| AU | 4.4 | 8.33 | 2.31 | 83.04 | 0 |
| BE | 7.5 | -13.33 | 2.20 | 91.63 | 7.97 |
| BG | 6.9 | -4.00 | 5.53 | 76.08 | - |
| CY | 4.0 | 11.11 | 3.70 | 86.74 | 0 |
| CZ | 5.3 | 0.00 | 4.40 | 86.58 | 0 |
| DE | 8.4 | 20.00 | 1.46 | 74.5 | -189.4 |
| DK | 3.8 | 13.64 | 1.83 | 85.49 | -47.6 |
| EE | 4.7 | -8.33 | 8.20 | 90.35 | 0 |
| ES | 8.3 | -3.13 | 3.61 | 80.95 | 0 |
| FI | 6.9 | 8.33 | 3.35 | 84.69 | 0 |
| FR | 8.3 | -7.14 | 2.07 | 77.57 | 0 |
| GB | 5.3 | 3.13 | 2.75 | 79.30 | -159.4 |
| GR | 8.3 | 3.03 | 4.25 | 73.54 | 0 |
| HU | 7.4 | 0.00 | 3.95 | 90.22 | -77 |
| IE | 4.6 | 3.33 | 6.08 | 92.63 | -29.5 |
| IT | 6.1 | 10.34 | 1.47 | 74.37 | 6.1 |
| LT | 4.3 | 9.68 | 7.48 | 80.24 | -14.7 |
| LU | 4.1 | 3.85 | 4.72 | 93.43 | 0 |
| LV | 6.0 | 2.94 | 8.76 | 82.60 | 0 |
| MT | 6.4 | -13.33 | 1.78 | 92.63 | 0 |
| NL | 3.2 | -3.45 | 2.16 | 91.30 | -163 |
| PO | 9.6 | 6.67 | 4.06 | 74.93 | 0 |
| PT | 8.1 | 2.78 | 1.45 | 84.96 | 9.1 |
| RO | 6.4 | 13.79 | 5.61 | 68.14 | - |
| SE | 6.1 | -4.17 | 3.00 | 88.11 | -54.6 |
| SI | 4.9 | 4.55 | 4.41 | 80.26 | -17.7 |
| SK | 11.1 | -7.69 | 5.61 | 84.13 | 0 |