

ENERGY AND ENVIRONMENT:
THE NEW 'COAL AND STEEL' OF THE UNION FOR THE MEDITERRANEAN

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The European Union (EU) is facing a growing dependence on politically risky countries in its energy imports following the decrease of Norwegian reserves. According to the European Commission, in 2030, the EU will import 90% of its oil (70% today) and 70% of its natural gas (40% today) to produce its electricity. The war in Iraq and the instability in the Middle East, on the one hand, and the tensions with Russia regarding gas import, on the other, have shown the necessity for Europe to diversify its supply sources. Hence, Mediterranean countries and most of all oil-rich Libya and gas producer Algeria are among the priorities on the European Union foreign policy agenda.

At the same time, Mediterranean countries suffer from growing environmental stresses. The most predominant of these new security threats is water scarcity as the region is considered the most affected by water resources depletion in the world. To be able to face these growing tensions, Mediterranean countries must be able to acquire technologies and water treatment and management tools from its European neighbors, as well as develop new supplying routes that will only be achieved through a comprehensive pan-Mediterranean policy.

There is an abundant literature analyzing the negative impacts of resource scarcity on the outbreak and strengthening of international conflicts. I believe, however, that in the case of the Mediterranean region, energy and environmental security concerns will contribute to enhanced cooperation by offering the two functional pillars on which the Union for the Mediterranean will be able to prove its legitimacy and efficacy. Only by tackling those central long-term security concerns through concrete projects and a “petit pas” approach similar to the original Coal and Steel Community, will the Union for the Mediterranean stand on solid foundations.

Theoretical framework of European integration

Traditionally the debate in European integration theory has been between the neofunctionalists and the intergovernmentalists (Haas 1958, 1964; Hoffmann 1966; Lindberg and Scheingold 1971). The study of the European energy security problematic and environmental policy in the empirical frame of EU's policy towards the Mediterranean region should be able to shed some light on integration policies with neighboring regions.

Neofunctionalism and intergovernmentalism have focused attention on the role of actors and structures in the overall integration process (Verdun 2002). Intergovernmentalists assume that national governments are the core actors and only pursue further integration if it is in the direct interest of 'the state' (Moravcsik 1993; Milward 1992). In this view, the state is considered to be more or less a unitary actor. More sophisticated analyses seek to explain the preferences of the state by understanding the domestic politics underlying those preferences, though domestic politics also focus on the economic best interest of subnational agents (Moravcsik 1998).

Neofunctionalism, in its various permutations, has focused on why integration happens by including the role of societal actors, functional and political spill-over, and the role of supranational institutions (Burkley and Mattli 1993; Corbey 1995; Sandholtz and Stone Sweet 1998; Tranholm Mikkelsen 1991). Neofunctionalists theorize about the circumstances in which political actions moves from the national to the European level. The relevant actors are the governments, the societal actors and the supranational actors that take over some of the tasks previously performed at the national level and act as policy entrepreneurs. The core mechanism in neofunctionalism is spill-over. This concept was later translated and nuanced by neoinstitutionalists into concepts such as 'path dependence' and 'unintended consequences' (Hall and Taylor 1994; Pierson 1996). More recent approaches, such as multilevel governance (Marks and Hooghe 2000; Eising and Kohler-Koch 1999), have also opened a constructive debate with neofunctionalism by focusing on how the European integration process happens at the same time at various levels.

Environment and Energy in the Mediterranean Partnership

This theoretical framework should be applied to the realities of energy and water supplies within the Euro-Mediterranean regional integration schemes today as they both constitute growing concerns that shape European and Mediterranean countries foreign policy. On the one hand, the gas crisis and blackmail resulting from European dependence towards Russia has demonstrated last year how it is crucial for the European Union to ensure alternative supply routes. This necessity has been reinforced by the high oil prices that skyrocketed before the global economic crisis and will eventually come back to high levels in 2010-2011.

On the other hand, the growing water stress (the main environmental concern experienced by South and Eastern Mediterranean countries) is becoming a central question for Mediterranean countries in the shaping of their external policies. Environmental and energy concerns have therefore been rightly included as the central objectives of the newly created Union for the Mediterranean. Water de-pollution is tackled through one of the six pillar of the institutional scheme as well as the development of renewable energies.

The Union for the Mediterranean has indeed identified six priority projects which are at the heart of the new institutional scheme between the EU and its Mediterranean neighbors:

- the de-pollution of the Mediterranean Sea;
- the establishment of maritime and land highways;
- civil protection initiatives to combat natural and man-made disasters;
- a Mediterranean solar energy plan;
- the inauguration of the Euro-Mediterranean University in Slovenia;
- and the Mediterranean Business Development Initiative focusing on micro, small and medium-sized enterprises.

These new projects are complementing the international cooperation actions and institutions that had been previously developed through the Barcelona process. In the field of water management for example, those institutions included the Euro-Mediterranean Water Information System (EMWIS), an initiative of the Euro-Mediterranean Partnership, which provides a strategic tool for exchanging information and knowledge in the water sector between and within the Euro Mediterranean partnership countries. This initiative already concerned:

- The 27 EU member states
- The 10 Mediterranean Partner Countries signatories of the Barcelona Declaration (Algeria, Egypt, Israel, Jordan, Lebanon, Morocco, Palestine, Syria, Tunisia and Turkey)
- The Balkan countries and Lybia since the Euro-Med Water Directors meeting held in Rome (Nov. 2005).

It is also important to note that the first and most important to date Union for the Mediterranean intergovernmental meeting was tackling the issue of water security. On December 22nd 2008, this ministerial conference on water, co-chaired by France, Egypt and Jordan, had a double objective. The first was to define the main lines of the water strategy for the Mediterranean which should be approved by these same ministers in 2010 and submitted if possible as soon as possible to the Heads of Governments at the time of their second Summit. The other objective was to mobilize the governance authorities of this Process to set priorities on the identification of water related infrastructure projects in line with this strategy and on the mobilization of financial organizations in favor of these projects.

Energy security and European Union foreign policy making

Regarding the European Union's external energy policies, the focus has been on the energy dialogue with non-EU Mediterranean countries since 1995 (Belyi, 2008). The Declaration of Barcelona was adopted during the Euro-Mediterranean Conference and aimed as one of its main priority to promote cooperation in the field of energy. The philosophy of the approach is to

establish a free trade area gathering energy producing and consuming countries. The Energy Forum created by the Declaration of Barcelona is attempting to regulate energy trade practices while reducing uncertainties. For instance, the EU is pushing for a market based approach to gas supplies by renegotiating existing contracts with non-EU suppliers.


Those contracts are indeed characterized by two negative components according to the EU, two clauses on which the EU and its Mediterranean suppliers currently disagree. The first one is the fact that those agreements are based on long terms contract with fixed prices calculations. The second is the 'destination clause' which contains restrictions on the onward sales and use of gas to a contractually specified area which prevents resales of surpluses to third parties and protects price levels. The new agreements Mediterranean countries are drafting would give a non-EU gas producer direct access to European gas consumer while at the same time including a reciprocity clause: non-EU states must liberalize their retail markets to access the Union's retail markets.

In November 2007, during the EU-Africa-Middle East Conference in Sharm El Sheikh, Andris Piebalgs, the current Energy Commissioner for the European Union, gave a speech describing how the European Union planned to tackle the global energy security and climate change challenges. The centrality of the relations with Mediterranean countries was clearly affirmed. As far as regional diplomacy is concerned, the Barcelona Process supported regional efforts to develop harmonized legal and regulatory energy frameworks through such initiatives as development of a Euro-Mashrek gas market, the integration of electricity markets in Maghreb and cooperation between energy regulators.

One of the main priorities of the Barcelona Process in the field of energy was the completion of an electricity and gas ring in the Euro-Mediterranean region. Another key project was the Arab Gas Pipeline that would bring additional gas resources from Egypt and potentially Iraq to the EU. The definition of those projects as strategic priorities have been confirmed during the Euro-Med Ministerial meeting that took place on 17 December 2007 in Cyprus. The

infrastructure linking North African gas resources and the European Union is very limited in comparison with Eastern European routes to import Russian gas (Fig. 1). The implementation of the Barcelona Process recommendations are therefore of vital importance to ensure both the interdependence of both regional blocks and the securitization of European energy supplies.

Figure 1. Map of Mediterranean Gas Infrastructure



Note: LNG = liquefied natural gas.
Sources: European Union; Poten and Partners.

Table 2 gives a comprehensive view of the importance of the energy sector for North African countries as well as the status of their reserves. The development of supplies from the Southern bank of the Mediterranean to European countries would seriously ease the problematic of European energy security for the European Union

Table 1. Key Economic and Energy Statistics for the Maghreb, 2002


Country	Population (millions)	GDP (billions of dollars)	Percent of GDP Energy	Percent of Revenues from Energy	External Debt (billions of dollars)	Oil Reserves (billion barrels)	Gas Reserves (trillion cubic meters)	Oil Production (thousands of barrels per day)	Gas Production (billion cubic meters)
Algeria	32.8	167	30	60	21.6	9.2	4.52	1659	80.4
Libya	5.5	41	25	N.A.	4.4	29.5	1.31	1376	5.7
Egypt	74.7	268	N.A.	N.A.	30.5	3.7	3.51	751	22.7
Tunisia	9.9	63	N.A.	N.A.	13.6	0.3	Minor	76	Minor
Morocco	31.7	115	N.A.	N.A.	17.7	Minor	Minor	Minor	Minor

Note: N.A. = not available.

Sources: U.S. Central Intelligence Agency; BP.


Finally figures 2 to 4 detail the importance of Algerian gas hegemony and the geopolitical implication of Libyan oil reserves. They also show how European markets are of a crucial importance for those energy suppliers.

Figure 2. Shares of Mediterranean Natural Gas Reserves, 2003




Source: BP Statistical Report, 2003.

Figure 3. Algeria's Exports of Liquefied Natural Gas, 2000



Source: Cedigaz, 2000.

Figure 4. Shares of Mediterranean Oil Reserves, 2003



Source: BP Statistical Report, 2003.

Water Scarcity and Mediterranean countries environmental security

Water has become an integral part of national strategies security. Present impact of water scarcity and its link with the food security problematic both in the short and long term catalyses the need for countries to build a net of alliances, technological cooperation agreements and strategic partnership. Water access has to be considered today as a central issue of foreign policy making for Mediterranean countries. Technological advanced powers such as the European Union or, to a lesser degree, Israel, are able to use technological transfers and environmental know-how as a bargaining chip in negotiations with countries suffering from water scarcity or contamination. At the same time, river contamination or massive water transfers in the case of transboundary resources can fuel tensions with bordering countries as it is the case with Turkey today. The regional water hegemony experienced today by Turkey results in a security threat for its neighboring countries.

On the other hand, as water is such an exceptional resource directly linked with human survival, wisdom has often overcome greed and the concerns today about water preservation can constitute an historical opportunity to build long-lasting cooperation agreements for sustainable development. Water resource management is thus a strategic issue on which the Union for the Mediterranean could gain legitimacy and forge new cooperation agreement in the region. The agreement signed between Israel and Jordan on the Yarmouk River, for example, is an encouraging sign on how water diplomacy can lead to greater cooperation. If the water canal project between the Dead Sea and the Red Sea is implemented, the already surnamed “peace canal” would represent another key step towards stability and sustainable development in the region.

The majority of European countries today do not face yet a struggle linked to water stress or contamination. As seen earlier, their main preoccupation results from energy dependency towards Russia and Middle Eastern countries on both gas and oil supplies. However, although

water resource depletion does not have everyday consequences on Europe, there are multiple reasons why this issue should be placed at the top of the agenda. Those reasons are moral, financial and strategic.

Moral reasons because water scarcity kills ten times more people than the sum of every armed conflict in the world today. The annually sustainable supply of potable water for the globe is approximately 14,000 km³ (Gleick, 2000) which represents a little less than four times the current level of all recorded water withdrawal by society. However this global figure hides a strong recent increase in the depletion of supplies and dramatic differences in regional supply-demand balances. Even though active debate exists about the worldwide demand and supply regarding water (Kenski, 1990; Postel 1996; Rogers 1993), few would argue about the presence of gross inequities in the availability of uncontaminated water across both spatial and temporal dimensions (Rausser, 2000). As studies in World Bank (1992; 2006) have noted, diarrheal diseases from unsanitary water kill more than 3 million people per year, or one person every ten seconds, most of them children.

Financial reasons because Europe is the only economic power in the region that possesses the financial leverage to carry out important water access and sanitization programs. Between 2000 and 2004, the United States spent around 3 billion dollars on such programs in Iraq and Afghanistan with very promising results (Galland 2008). They are unlikely to renew this effort towards North Africa but it shows that when the political will exists, such programs are successful. The financial returns on investments would also be important. Water supply demands have increased at a strong rate in the last years and European corporations are technological leaders in this sector. They would be well-advised to be the first one to invest in countries that according to the IMF should experience a strong economic growth in the next twenty years that will have strong positive impact on the European aging economies. France, especially, would be willing to serve as a leader in this sectoral cooperation through its corporate champions, Suez and Veolia.

Strategic reasons finally because water dispute is the source of many rising international and intranational conflicts. Juliette Jowitt (2008) described Water as the “New Oil” and the Global Policy forum following the declaration by Ban-Ki Moon, U.N. Secretary General, on November 2nd 2008, forecasted that 50 countries on five continents might soon be caught up in water disputes unless they move quickly to establish agreements on how to share reservoirs, rivers, and underground water aquifers. Moreover, there is a clear correlation between urban insalubrities (often linked with restricted access to water) and rise of terrorism as demonstrated by Mona El Kody, who heads the National Water Research in Egypt, in her address to the 2003 World Water Forum in Kyoto, “*Water shortages foster Terrorism*”.

Of the environmental threats in the Mediterranean, that of water is becoming more binding by the day under the pressure of the growing population and as the demand for industrial and urban uses competes with agriculture for the meager supplies (Alexandratos 2003). A study by the International Water Management Institute (IWMI) for 45 countries classifies six countries of the Mediterranean region (Jordan, Syria, Tunisia, Egypt, Algeria and Israel) in the category of those facing *physical water scarcity*: a level of depletion which means that “*even with the highest feasible efficiency and productivity of water use, (these) countries do not have sufficient water resources to meet their agricultural, domestic, industrial and environmental needs in 2025*” (IWMI 2000, p.3). Indeed, Jordan, Syria and Israel cannot even meet their present needs. Turkey and Morocco are part of a different category facing *economic water scarcity*: a level of depletion in which countries have “*sufficient potential water resources to meet 2025 needs but will have to increase water supplies through additional storage, conveyance and regulation systems by 25% or more over 1995 levels to meet these 2025 needs*” (IWMI 2000, p.4). Both countries also face severe and development capacity problems in meeting their water needs.

European countries, on the other hand, faces water stress in only very limited conditions and enjoy an important hydraulic balance. Moreover, European countries possess the technology in water management and treatment that Mediterranean countries eagerly need. The have/have

not balance is thus opposite to the one characterizing energy supply and demand offering strong opportunities for dual cooperation along the lines of a Ricardian comparative advantage matrix.

Environmental and energy cooperation on a Monnet's "petit pas" project oriented approach

The potential for enhanced cooperation in the Mediterranean in the energy and water sectors fits well with the traditional regional integration theoretical approaches. The implication of the states is a sine qua non condition in such strategic and security oriented fields. National governments, as the core actors in international relations, would pursue a further regional integration and implication within an institutional design tackling those problematic as it is in their direct interest (intergovernmentalism). At the same time the achievement of cooperation on such vital goods (water, energy) demands the implication of all societal actors, ensuring an undeniable functional and political spill-over through the projects implemented by a supranational institutional scheme (neo-functionalism).


However, energy and environmental cooperation is based on long terms projects and decisions that result in financially demanding infrastructure development. The recent war in Gaza led to a suspension of most activities of the Union for the Mediterranean and paralyzed the institutional development in the region. Such a lack of strong implications of state would jeopardize any long term horizon-oriented institutional integration on energy and environmental sectors. Hence I believe a Union for the Mediterranean organized only on intergovernmental means of decisions would fail. As it was the case for the Coal and Steel community in 1950, only a supranational entity with sovereignty on the limited scope agreed by the member states (water, energy infrastructure) would eventually succeed in such a daunting and urgent task (ensure energy security, provide water to Mediterranean citizens). The emergency of both problematic (water depletion, high energy costs and unreliable supplies) would serve as an incentives for

national commitment. The Coal and Steel Community designed by Jean Monnet has to serve as a model again.

The means idealized by the mentor of the Schuman Plan to reach the proposed goals was integration, legally “co-substantiated” through the formation of a supranational organization that would receive parcels of sovereignty of its member states to manage common interests more effectively (Silva, 2008). To reach these goals, some theses were created which sustained the integration, and which in terms of their methodology, can be listed as follows: 1. The International Organization would move away from the traditional model of intergovernmentality; 2. It would be formed by a permanent institutional framework; 3. The institutions would receive from the States some parcels of sovereignty, in limited spheres, but which could be gradually extended to other spheres.

Finally, the institutional framework will only achieve its objectives if it aims at implementing concrete projects visible to the eyes of its citizens. The Mediterranean Renewable Energy Project (MEDREP – Fig. 5) that I developed with my colleagues Myriem Touhami and Françoise d’Estais at the United Nations Environment Program (UNEP) could be a good example. Such a project aims at developing renewable energy markets and has already been implemented in Tunisia with substantial success. The objective is to have a leadership actor (UNEP or the European Union) that would provide the funds to fuel the credit market by reducing the interest rate on a solar water heater purchase. Those funds would at the end of the cycle be recovered in the form of carbon credits creating a win-win scenario. These credits would serve to provide citizens with solar water heaters whose use would reduce their energy consumption, providing additional supplies to European energy demanding countries.

Fig. 5: MEDREP Project



Similar projects could be developed with the objective to improve the efficiency of water management policies and infrastructures especially in large urban areas in the Mediterranean, providing Syria, Jordan, Algeria with the technology they need. The presence of Ban-Ki-Moon at the signing ceremony of the Union for the Mediterranean in Paris last July and the focus on energy and environment preservation as core objective of the organization have led to the definition of numerous projects within UNEP that have already been approved by several European countries (Italy, France, Balkans...). They could serve as practical and effective implementation of a functionalist organization.

In conclusion, environmental concerns and energy security are characterized by a reversed dependency between the European Union and its Mediterranean neighbors. This fact could serve as an opportunity to use both threats as a source of co-dependence and need for

enhanced institutional cooperation through the Union for the Mediterranean. In order to be effective, however, European and Mediterranean leaders would be wise to reflect back on the success of the Coal and Steel Community and its functionalist approach in order to ensure its sustainability. The sense of emergency experienced by countries facing high level of water stress should provide the incentive to consent to a limited loss of sovereignty to the benefit of the Union for the Mediterranean. Accurate practical projects already exist that could be implemented within this institutional scheme and would benefit all actors involved.

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